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Your Computer is Watching You:
Intelligent Agents and Social Facilitation
Jason R. Read
ABSTRACT
This study investigates whether the social facilitation effect takes place when a person
performs a computerized task that includes an animated intelligent agent (IA). The
moderating effects of two individual differences, locus of control (LOC) and
microcomputer playfulness (MCP), are tested for. It was proposed that an IA’s presence
would cause participants to exhibit this effect and that LOC and MCP would moderate a
participant’s arousal, measured as state anxiety, such that those possessing an internal
LOC and those exhibiting high MCP would experience less arousal when performing
computerized tasks with an IA present. Data was analyzed using a 2 (task difficulty) x 4
(intelligent agent) repeated measures MANCOVA. Most hypotheses are not supported,
however MCP does appear to moderate arousal depending on the behavior of the IA.

v

Chapter One: Introduction
Modern technology continues to advance at an amazing rate. Much that was
implausible a few years ago is now a reality. Generally, technological advances are
looked upon as a boon. Increased microprocessing speeds enable users to complete
complex tasks in a fraction of the time they used to take. Messages can be communicated
electronically across the globe nearly instantaneously and for free.
One technological advance, the intelligent agent, is gradually making its way into
the workplace. The intelligent agent is a computer program that can take some of the
burden of work off of the employee by completing routine tasks. Also, the intelligent
agent is capable of monitoring a user’s work, learning from his or her behavior and
offering suggestions to improve performance. In many ways, intelligent agents resemble
another coworker, and perhaps a tutor, inside the computer. This is indeed a wonderful
invention. However, there may be some unforeseen consequences that could result from
such a computerized “coworker/tutor.”
There is a growing body of research that indicates, quite convincingly, that people
often react socially to computers. Studies have demonstrated that people are sometimes
polite to computers, suffer in-group out-group effects with computers, and even find
some computers more attractive, trustworthy, and intelligent than other computers. At
first, this may sound a bit odd to the reader, after all a computer is only a machine. But
this is a response that has been demonstrated repeatedly in experiments (Nass & Moon,
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2000; Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994; Sproull,
Subramani, Kiesler, Walker, & Waters, 1996; Sundar, 1993; Sundar & Nass, 2000).
Consequently, if people actually respond to machines socially, then it is important to
consider the effects that computerized technology might cause before blindly
implementing new equipment in the workplace.
One possible social outcome is the social facilitation effect. For more than a
century, social scientists have observed how the mere presence of a person can influence
the performance of another. Research on this effect indicates that, oftentimes, simple
tasks are facilitated and complex tasks are impaired when a person has a witness present
(Aiello & Kolb, 1995; Aiello & Svec, 1993; Baron, Moore, & Sanders, 1978; Bond,
1982; Cottrell, 1972; Guerin & Innes, 1982; Hull, 1943; Mason & Brady, 1964; Sanna &
Shotland, 1990; Schmitt, Gilovich, Goore, & Joseph, 1986; Spence, 1956; Thiessen,
1964; Triplett, 1898; Zajonc, 1965; Zajonc & Sales, 1966).
Undoubtedly, a large body of evidence suggests the existence of the social
facilitation effect in person-person interactions. Might this phenomenon generalize to
person-intelligent agent interactions in computerized settings as well? Is it possible that
having an intelligent agent on a computer, one that is capable of evaluating performance,
carrying out routine tasks, and offering helpful suggestions, might cause users to
experience the social facilitation effect as if another person was present? If people
respond to computers as they do other people, then it is logical to presume that having an
intelligent agent present might also trigger the social facilitation effect, resulting in the
improvement of simple and the hindrance of complex tasks.

2

In this study, the relationship between social facilitation and person-agent
interaction was considered. Following a brief discussion of computers in the workplace,
intelligent agents are defined in detail and modern examples of intelligent agents are
provided. Next, research on social responses to computers is discussed in the context of
various examples of how people respond to computers in social ways. Characteristics
that invoke social responses in people and popular theories pertaining to this phenomenon
are then detailed. Next, the social facilitation effect is described and theories on why
social facilitation occurs are delineated. Finally, two likely moderators of this effect are
considered: locus of control and microcomputer playfulness. Brief descriptions of these
traits and the rationale for their relevance to this study are provided. It was hypothesized
that people would experience social facilitation when they worked with intelligent agents,
responding in much the same way they would were another person present. Furthermore,
it was hypothesized that individual differences in locus of control and microcomputer
playfulness would moderate this effect.
Computers at Work
It is difficult to come up with a list of occupations that do not involve the use of
computers. Over the span of a few decades, computers have found their way into most
jobs and have replaced many tools once considered commonplace. Nearly obsolete are
the typewriter, carbon paper, adding machine, and address book, to name a few. It is
unequivocal that computers have proven their worth to modern organizations and most
employers would balk at the idea of carrying out business without them.
In the last several decades, the number of people using computers in the
workplace has grown tremendously. At the same time, the number of people using the
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Internet and e-mail programs has also rapidly increased. For instance, in 2001 it was
estimated that over 80 percent of people working in the managerial and professional
specialty occupations used computers and over 70 percent of people in technical, sales
and administrative support occupations did so. Employees involved in these occupations
perform a number of computer related tasks: word processing, use of spreadsheets and
databases, connecting to the Internet, use of a computer for calendar and scheduling,
graphics and design, and programming (National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, n.d.).
All of the previously detailed uses for computers can and have served to change
the nature of work. Productivity may increase as a result of more efficient computerized
tasks. Access to upper levels of management may encourage employees to make
themselves better heard (through e-mail). Telecommuting is becoming more common
and allows for more flexible and accommodating employee scheduling, which may
increase job satisfaction. Secretarial tasks are largely more streamlined as word
processors and mail merging is now the norm. Alarm reminders can be used to prevent
employees from forgetting important deadlines and schedules. Electronic spreadsheets
can now keep figures almost flawlessly, eliminating the need to check and recheck one’s
arithmetic with a calculator (Ryburn, n.d.). It would seem that computers could only
continue to improve productivity in the workplace.
All of the previous cases are examples of computer support. Computer support
“involves goal-enabling technologies and associated hardware, software, services, and
techniques (Coovert & Thompson, 2001, p. 10).” Some particularly advanced examples
of computer support include: artificial intelligence, extended reality, nomadic computing
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technology, and intelligent agents. Although these types of advanced computer support
are not as widespread, they are growing in popularity. This study will focus on
intelligent agent technology specifically.
Intelligent Agents
Intelligent agents (IAs) are advanced computer programs that simulate intelligent
behavior while executing specific tasks to assist computer users. The computer industry
has developed a variety of programs of this type. They go by many names: autonomous
agents, adaptive interfaces, intelligent interfaces, and knowbots (Chen, Houston,
Nunamaker, and Yen, 1996). Research in IAs is pursued by a variety of disciplines
including artificial intelligence, knowledge-based systems, cognitive science and
psychology, machine learning, human-machine interaction, robotics, and data
communications, to name a few (Sarma, 1996). Accompanying the variety of names to
identify IAs and the assortment of fields in which it is studied, IAs also have several
definitions. Coovert and Thompson (2001) define an IA as “a computer program that
performs tasks without direct human supervision. An IA is considered to be an assistant
or helper rather than a conventional electronic tool (p. 8).” Chen et al. (1996) view IAs
as a way to help different computer programs perform “… convergent tasks, thus freeing
users for more creative work (p.62).” Furthermore, Sarma (1996) describes IAs as
“cousins of robots which give the impression that they are capable of thinking, feeling,
and living (p. 105).”
As one can see, researchers define IA programs in different ways, attributing
many different characteristics to them. At the same time, however, it is important to note
that these definitions have a great deal in common. IAs appear to be in a category of
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their own, separate from conventional computer programs, and therefore worthy of
specific research tailored to their exceptional roles.
Intelligent Agent Characteristics
Despite the many definitions for IAs, there is still a great deal left unexplained.
Reviewing the various characteristics that IAs are thought to possess can further clarify
what IA programs are. Although researchers do not completely agree on the
characteristics of IAs, there is much overlap. Coovert and Thompson (2001) list the
following seven characteristics for IAs in their book:
1. The ability to work asynchronously and autonomously without
intervention from humans,
2. The ability to change behavior according to accumulated knowledge, that
is, the ability to learn,
3. The ability to take initiative,
4. Inferential capability (i.e., the ability to go beyond the user’s concrete
instructions and use symbolic abstraction to solve problems),
5. Prior knowledge of general goals and preferred methods,
6. Natural language, and
7. Personality (p.14).
Similarly, Sarma suggests that an IA must possess: autonomy, social ability,
reactivity, pro-activeness, intelligence, mobility, veracity, benevolence, rationality,
selectivity, and robustness (1996). Further, Chen et al. (1996) believes that an IA must
possess the following attributes: be integrated, expressive, goal-oriented, cooperative, and
customized. Clearly, there is much expected of a computer program before it is worthy
of the label “intelligent agent.” As one might expect, some of these characteristics are
easier to develop than others. Thus, one may find that most IAs exhibit reactivity and the
ability to work asynchronously, while few agents show signs of true inferential
capability.
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Uses of Intelligent Agents
Referring to a computer program as “intelligent” brings up many assumptions and
expectations. Books and movies are filled with tales about intelligent machines. Popular
culture reflects a public fascination with cautionary tales of artificially intelligent
computers run amuck or performing tasks that no human could aspire to. Despite our
fascination, the reality of modern IAs is a far cry from this level of technological
accomplishment. IAs today are not freethinking super machines. Instead, they are
simply useful assistants, designed to help users carry out very specific tasks. For
example, some agents help sort email so that important messages are brought to the
reader’s attention and junk mail is immediately deleted. Others continually scan the
Internet, seeking news articles that the user might enjoy and find interesting. Further,
Maes (1994) provided several examples of IAs that were currently in the process of being
tested at the time of her article’s publication. These were “Maxims,” an electronic mail
agent, “NewT,” a news filtering agent, “Ringo,” an entertainment selection agent, and a
meeting-scheduling agent. These are but a few examples, many more types of IAs exist.
How Do Intelligent Agents Work?
Although a technical description of the inner workings of an IA program are
beyond the scope of this paper, it is still important to have a general idea of what an IA
does. One of the most important characteristics of IAs is the ability to learn. IAs are
visualized as computer programs that learn from experience and get better at serving a
computer user over time (Sarma, 1996). Computer programmers attempt to develop IA
programs that can observe and imitate the behavior of a user while he/she is working on a
task. The idea behind this is that the IA will eventually note patterns in the users’
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behavior that can be easily automated. The IA is essentially “looking over the shoulder”
of the user (Maes, 1994) and learning from his/her actions. Other ways an IA can learn
are through feedback from a user (e.g., instructions to do or not do some task),
instructions received from a user (e.g., “Please delete all email that I receive from John
Smith.”), and by requesting advice from other similar IAs either on the same computer or
on other computers via the Internet.
This ability to learn forces programmers to approach the programming of IAs in
an unusual manner. For example, sometimes programmers create IAs that a user must
partially program. As one can imagine, this is not a very popular method. It requires the
user to create a collection of rules that guide the action of the IA program. This method
is exhibited in many email agents, such as Microsoft Outlook’s “email rule” option. In
contrast to this approach, the most popular method of programming IAs is through the
knowledge-based approach (Maes, 1994).
The knowledge-based approach requires that a programmer with extensive
domain-specific background knowledge create an intelligent agent (Maes, 1994). In
other words, an agent programmed according to the knowledge-based approach would
already possess extensive knowledge and skills in some specific domain when purchased
by the user. The agent would begin immediately offering to automate certain patterns of
behavior that it notes and would interject comments to help the user along. Microsoft
office has an agent very much like this. It is the office assistant (often depicted as an
animated paperclip) that activates in Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Outlook. Though it
is a bit unsophisticated, the Microsoft office agent represents a simple example of an IA
with domain-specific background knowledge (e.g., grammar and spelling rules)
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programmed beforehand. Agents can also learn from direct and indirect feedback
provided by a user (Maes, 1994). Neglected agent suggestions would constitute indirect
feedback while specific orders to stop a certain behavior would constitute a more direct
feedback for the agent to learn from.
Another characteristic of IAs that is important to point out is that they exhibit
initiative. This one characteristic makes IAs very different from traditional computer
programs. Users manipulate traditional programs. They activate them, control them, and
decide when they perform their tasks. In contrast, an IA is capable of performing tasks
by itself, without being specifically activated by someone. This does not mean that the
user is out of control. He or she may still perform the same tasks manually, bypassing
the agent entirely. But if the user should so desire, the agent may be permitted to
automatically carry out certain tasks without bothering the user (Sarma, 1996). It is this
initiative that, in addition to certain anthropomorphized attributes and personality
characteristics, can make an IA seem almost alive.
Why Use Intelligent Agents?
In “Intelligent Software” by Pattie Maes (1995), this theorist explains that many
computer capabilities often go unrealized, and therefore unused, by the average computer
user due to their complexity. Many of our daily activities have become computer based.
There are computers on our cell phones, palm pilots, televisions, even in our cars, not to
mention on many desktops around the world. At the same time, most people are not
formally trained to use computers. Coupled with the fact that most programs currently
respond only to direct manipulation, they are hardly utilized to their fullest ability. As
time goes by and computers become more complicated, this problem is exacerbated.
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What is needed is a way to delegate complex tasks to computers, a way around the
passivity that is today’s computer program. What is needed is a computer that knows
what it is capable of and can carry out actions on its own, initiating communication with
a user, and monitoring what is taking place in and on a computer. Intelligent agents may
be the solution.
IAs will eliminate the need for highly detailed and specific instructions provided
by computer users. In much the same way that graphical user interfaces have simplified
the complicated jargon of operating systems (e.g., Windows), one day IAs may simplify
most complex activities carried out by the computer system. In essence, the IA will be
one’s personal secretary or assistant, saving only the most creative functions for the
user’s limited attention and time.
Example of an Intelligent Agent
One example of an IA is COACH. Selker (1994) wrote about COACH, the
Cognitive Adaptive Computer Help system. COACH is “a system that records user
experience to create personalized user help (p. 92).” This program internally watches the
users’ actions on a computer, records those actions, and offers advice when it recognizes
a need for it. The COACH program does not get in the way of the user. It merely waits
for the right time to offer assistance. For instance, Selker offers the example of a person
writing a computer program. The person types in a command that has certain
requirements (i.e., must be named and have an argument list provided). COACH would
be familiar with this need and remind the person to provide the required name and
arguments if it recognized a need for guidance.
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In addition to offering advice, COACH notes errors that are made over time in
computer programming. If the programmer makes few, then COACH internally notes
that the experience of the programmer is more advanced and consequently it offers
advice that only a more advanced programmer would require. This expertise level
designation is slow to change, in order to correctly assess programmer levels and not be
in a constant state of flux and therefore relentlessly offering differing levels of advice,
which would make it unappealing to a person. Slowly, COACH comes to understand its
user’s needs. This type of agent “builds a user relationship with the explicit goal of
educating the individual (Selker, 1994, p.93).”
Problems Associated with Intelligent Agents
Intelligent agents may sound like a good solution to the ever-increasing
complexity of computerized technology. However, it is important to note that there are
still a variety of concerns about how people feel about and respond to them. Potential
problems that people face when they interact with IAs include the loss of feelings of
control, overblown expectations, and safety and privacy issues (Norman, 1994).
Feeling of control. People value the feeling of control over their lives and their
surroundings. Before a person will be willing to use an IA, he/she must understand it, at
least on a basic level, and have confidence in its abilities. History has shown us that,
some people have a tendency to resist the introduction of novel automated functions in
machines (e.g., automatic transmission, autopilot on a plane). This resistance is common
and not completely unwarranted. Humans make machines. Humans make mistakes.
Sometimes systems are poorly designed and problems occur. So, in order for IAs to be
acceptable, users need to feel like they can control, undo, and monitor an IA’s activities.
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This need will be particularly evident when a user is first introduced to IAs. During this
introductory period, an IA would do well to make its presence known and carefully
explain what actions it performs. The user’s desire for knowledge about the IA will
likely fade with time as trust increases. Nonetheless, most users will appreciate the
option of receiving a full report of an IA’s actions (Norman, 1994).
Overblown expectations. It is likely that once IAs are accepted, expectations of
their abilities will become exaggerated and perhaps unrealistic. Overblown claims about
the capabilities of IAs, in conjunction with their anthropomorphized presentation, may
contribute to this problem. Creating an IA with a human-like image (on the computer
screen) may cause the user to form expectations of human-like behavior and thought. In
fact, there are some who believe that it is immoral to offer agents in human form.
Because this is such a controversial topic, it has been suggested that IAs be offered with
the option to have the human-like image disabled for users who prefer not to see it
(Norman, 1994).
Safety and privacy. A final concern is that IAs may eventually have access to
personal records, correspondence, and financial activities. Even though IAs may be
helpful to computer users, their intrusiveness makes some users uncomfortable. It is
likely that when IAs become more common, that privacy and confidentiality will be one
of the major issues confronting their widespread use. One day in the near future, there is
likely to be much deliberation about IA access and limitations (Norman, 1994).
In summary, intelligent agents are computer programs that simulate intelligent
behavior while executing specific tasks to assist computer users. Defined in many
different ways, and going by a assortment of labels, these programs possess various
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similar characteristics including, but not limited to, the ability to learn, initiative,
personality, social ability, and customizability. IAs are currently used for rather
simplistic tasks such as email filtering or task scheduling, but have the potential to be
used for much more. Most notably, IAs are programmed to be capable of learning from a
person’s computer-use habits and can automate routine behaviors to assist a user more
and more over time. These characteristics, combined with a vast set of pre-programmed
knowledge will allow IAs to assist users to utilize their computers to their fullest
potential. It is worth noting that IAs have some potential pitfalls such as user issues with
control, overblown expectations, safety, and privacy, but overall their benefits seem to
overshadow their limitations. They are powerful, have the potential for great utility, and
will likely continue to increasingly facilitate interactions with computers.
However, there is still much to be discovered about how people interact with IA
programs. Over the years, researchers have observed that human interactions with
computerized technology can be highly influenced by a person’s social proclivities.
When considering the utility of IA, it is important to be mindful of the social reactions
that people can have with computerized technology in general.
Social Responses to Computers
It is often the case that people respond to, and interact socially with, computers.
This is a strange phenomenon. After all, a computer is a machine. Machines do not
possess emotions; they lack any feelings to hurt. Anything expressed by a computer is
usually a preprogrammed response, not a personal message from the computer to a
specific user. It is reasonable to assume that the proper way to treat a computer, besides
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with the customary care to avoid breaking it, is as an inanimate object, unworthy of social
conventions and certainly undeserving of any type of emotional response.
In studies designed to examine human-computer social interaction, participants
are often asked whether they think computers have feelings or any other humanlike
characteristics. Participants in these types of studies tend to deny such beliefs (Nass &
Moon, 2000; Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999; Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997). Despite these
assertions, people have been shown to exhibit social responses to computers (Nass et al.,
1997; Nass et al., 1999; Nass & Moon, 2000; Sproull, Subramani, Kiesler, Walker, &
Waters, 1996; Sundar & Nass, 2000). The manner in which people socially interact with
computers would be better explained if participants were interacting with humanlike
robots or computers displaying realistic faces and acting like humans (e.g., exhibiting
emotions or referring to itself in the first person.) However, in studies of humancomputer social interaction, most human characteristics or behaviors are deliberately
excluded from the computers that participants are asked to interact with.
There are numerous examples to choose from of people interacting with
computers in a social manner. Nass et al. (1999) provided one such example. They
showed that people treat computers politely, as if concerned about hurting a computer’s
“feelings.” Participants in this study were tutored by a computer and then later asked to
rate the performance of that computer in the tutoring session. Some participants were
asked to rate the computer on a pencil and paper questionnaire. Others were asked to rate
the tutor computer on a separate computer across the room. Still others were asked to
perform the rating on the same terminal on which they had received the tutoring.
Participants rating the tutor computer on the same terminal, rated it more favorably than
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those asked to do the rating on a pencil and paper questionnaire or a separate terminal. It
was as if the participants who had to rate the computer “face to face” so to speak, were
being polite to it. But why would participants feel as though they had to be polite to a
machine? Surely these participants would not have reported that the machines had
feelings. Despite this, in this example, people reacted toward computers in a socially
polite manner. In fact, in this experiment, during the post-experiment debriefing,
participants denied having been polite to the computer and stated that doing so was
unnecessary.
In a second example, Sproull et al. (1996) studied the effects of using a
computerized face on participant behavior and arousal. These researchers developed two
computer programs that performed the role of a career counselor for the participants.
Some of the participants received counseling from an entirely text-based display while
others received counseling from a talking-face display. No other attributes of the two
programs differed. That is to say, the talking face used exactly the same script that the
text-based display used. Sproull et al. found that participants were less relaxed and
assured in the face conditions than in the text conditions. Also, participants in the face
conditions displayed a more positive self-presentation. Apparently, having a
computerized face displayed during a program had an effect on the social behavior of
participants. In conditions in which the computer technology was presented as more
human-like (i.e., possessing a face), the interaction between human and computer seemed
to also be more human-like.
In one final example, Nass et al. (1997) showed that gender stereotypes could be
attributed to computers. In their study, participants received tutoring and an evaluation
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from computers using either male or female sounding voices. Computers tutoring about
the topic of computer technology were perceived by participants as being more
informative if the message was delivered with a male sounding voice. Conversely,
computers with female sounding voices were found to be more informative if the topic
delivered was about love and relationships. Furthermore, the evaluation was received
more positively if it came from a male voice rather than a female voice. All of these
effects reflect well-established social theories about gender roles (e.g., evaluation is more
valid if delivered by males and men know more about stereotypically “masculine”
topics). What made these findings so interesting is that all the information received by
the participants was identical in scripting, and was delivered by a computer, not a person.
Nonetheless, the participants responded to the computers the same way that literature
suggests they would have responded to a male or female delivering an identical tutoring
or evaluative message.
In reviewing the preceding evidence, it becomes clear that there is something
remarkable at work here. People are treating computers like other people even though
they report that they realize these computers are just machines. Researchers of this
occurrence have developed several theories to explain it. These theories include the
Computer as Medium (CAM) model, deficiency, anthropomorphism, and the Computer
as Source (CAS) model. In the next section, each theory is explained and considered as a
possible explanation for this behavior.
CAM Model
According to the CAM model, people do not actually respond to the specific
computer that they are using. Instead, the model proposes that people are interacting with
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the programmer that created the computer program that they are utilizing. When a person
responds to a computer in a social manner, s/he is actually imagining the person who
wrote the program and responding to that unseen person (Sundar, 1993). The term used
to describe this phenomenon is parasocial interaction. According to the CAM model,
when a person behaves socially towards a medium (i.e., computer, television, or radio) as
if it were the source of the communication, that person is actually actively imagining the
true source and reacting to it instead. For instance, if someone yells at a radio because of
a message that they heard, this individual is not responding to the radio itself. Rather, the
individual is yelling at the imagined source of the message, that is, the radio
spokesperson.
In an attempt to examine the CAM model, Sundar and Nass (2000), devised an
approach to test whether a person using a computer believed they were in fact
communicating with an unseen programmer or the computer itself. In that study, these
researchers clearly demonstrated that participants behaved towards computers as if they
were the source of the interaction rather than the medium between user and programmer.
They demonstrated this by having participants use a computer during a tutoring, testing,
and evaluation session. Some of the participants were told that they were interacting with
a computer, others that they were interacting with a programmer or a networker. After
the interaction was completed, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire on the
performance of the computer, programmer, or networker. Participants exhibited
differences in their evaluations of the performance depending on which group they were
assigned. Clearly this would not have occurred if a person is merely visualizing an
unseen programmer when working on a computer and reacting to him/her. The labeling
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should not have made a difference in post task evaluations. This study casts some doubt
on the CAM theory of human-computer interaction.
In other studies of this type, participants have been asked directly if they are
thinking about a programmer when they are responding to the computers. Most deny any
such thoughts (Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass et al., 1997).
Deficiency
Another proposed explanation for human-computer social interaction is
deficiency. According to this theory, people respond to computers in a social manner
because they do not realize that they should not do so. Deficiency theory states that
people who are very young, socioemotionally limited, or ignorant, exhibit these social
behaviors towards computers. In other words, people respond the way they do because it
is the only way they know to respond. Although, it is logical to expect such people to
have some difficulty with proper responses to computers (i.e., not in a social manner), in
most of the studies cited, college students are used as participants (Nass et al., 1997; Nass
et al., 1999; Nass & Moon, 2000; Sproull et al., 1996; Sundar & Nass, 2000). These
students, who are not children, can be safely assumed to possess some minimal level of
intelligence, and certainly aren’t all socioemotionally limited. Given the age and
educational level of the average participant, it would seem that deficiency is an
inadequate explanation for their behaviors. Furthermore, it has been shown, in at least
one study (Nass & Moon, 2000) that both experienced and novice computer users alike
respond socially to computers.
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Anthropomorphism
Some theorists have tried to explain human-computer social interaction by way of
anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is the assignment of human traits to something
that is not human. However, anthropomorphism does not appear to be a suitable
explanation (Nass and Moon, 2000). Some have argued that, in the case of children,
anthropomorphism may be an explanation due to cognitive limitations (Turkle, 1984).
But, children are rarely the subjects of human-computer social interaction studies.
Participants in research of this nature are almost exclusively college students.
Furthermore, the idea behind anthropomorphism is that a person actually believes that an
inanimate object or animal possesses human characteristics. However, if participants
were questioned as to whether they believed inanimate objects possessed human
characteristics, they would likely deny harboring any belief of this nature.
Some researchers propose that human social reactions to computers are a case of
ethopoeia (Nass and Moon, 2000; Nass, Steuer, Henriksen, & Dryer, 1994). The Greek
word ethopoeia describes a situation in which someone exhibits “a direct response to an
entity as human while knowing that the entity does not warrant human treatment or
attribution” (p. 96). The Computer as Source (CAS) model further describes the case of
ethopoeia applied to human-computer interaction.
CAS Model and Mindlessness
According to recent research, people do not seem to be responding to a hidden
programmer in human-computer interaction experiments (cf. Nass & Moon, 2000;
Sundar & Nass, 2000). Further, mental insufficiency or anthropomorphism has been
effectively ruled out as possible explanations. Given the apparent logical constraints of
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the previous arguments, one might consider the possibility that people are actually
responding to computers as the source of communications and consequently reacting
socially to them.
But how can an intelligent adult, fully aware that s/he is interacting with a
machine, respond to a piece of machinery, a computer, as if it were a person? Nass and
Moon (2000) proposed that the key to understanding this phenomenon is Langer’s (1992)
mindlessness theory.
According to Langer, when someone is behaving in a mindless manner, s/he is on
autopilot. Essentially, such a person is behaving in predetermined ways with very little
attention being devoted to responding to new stimuli or absorbing novel information.
When in this state, a person behaves according to rules and mental shortcuts that have
been developed in the past (Langer, 2000).
Langer (2000) describes mindlessness this way:
When we are in a state of mindlessness, we act like automatons that have been
programmed to act according to the sense our behavior made in the past, rather
than the present. Instead of actively drawing new distinctions, noticing new
things, as we do when we are mindful, when we are mindless we rely on
distinctions drawn in the past. We are stuck in a single, rigid perspective, and we
are oblivious to alternative ways of knowing. (p. 220)
Nass and Moon (2000) propose that when a person responds mindlessly to a
computer, they are in fact responding to a few salient contextual cues that the computer
exhibits. “These cues trigger various scripts, labels, and expectations, which in turn
focus attention on certain information while diverting attention away from other
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information” (p. 83). In other words, people note certain cues and respond to those cues
without giving any further consideration to the fact that they are coming from an
inanimate object, a computer. When this happens, people rely on scripts and schemata
that were previously developed in response to other people, not machines. Mindlessly,
people react to the computer-generated cues as if they were dealing with another human
being.
So what types of cues are necessary to generate a social response from a computer
user? Nass and Moon (2000) suggest three cues that computers regularly employ that
may cause a person to mindlessly treat their computer in a social manner. One cue is
language. Computer programs, to communicate with users, are programmed to use
language in the form of text or audible verbal output. A second cue is interactivity.
Some computer programs are designed to respond based on prior inputs by a user. Such
user contingent behavior may elicit social responses from a person. Finally, computers
often fill certain roles, normally held by people. Computers can serve as tutors,
evaluators, and counselors, to name but a few. The role a computer fills may also cause a
person to respond socially.
In summary, cues such as language, interactivity, and role filled, may cause a
computer user to temporarily forget or fail to even consider that s/he is using a machine
when certain social responses are called for. Nass and Moon (2000) propose that it is this
mental lapse, this automated response in reaction to contextual cues, which causes people
to treat their computers like they would treat another person. That is to say, it is not the
case that people think the computer is alive or deserving of this special treatment.
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Rather, people simply react thoughtlessly, in a manner to which one is accustomed, when
exposed to certain cues.
So, we have an odd tendency to follow some social conventions with computers
despite the fact that we are aware that we are dealing with an inanimate object (Nass &
Moon, 2000; Nass et al., 1999; Nass et al., 1997; Nass et al., 1994; Sproull et al., 1996;
Sundar, 1993; Sundar & Nass, 2000; Turkle, 1984). Researchers have demonstrated that
we treat our computers with politeness, react physiologically to a computerized face, and
even attribute gender stereotypes to computers. Several theories have been offered to
explain this: the CAM model, deficiency, anthropomorphism, and the CAS model. Of
them, the CAS model seems most promising. It proposes that people attend to
environmental cues and mindlessly respond according to predetermined scripts. Cues
found to do this include language use, interactivity, and role filled.
Might people exhibit social responses to intelligent agent technology as well?
Software designers have programmed intelligent agents to be extremely human-like. It is
therefore critical for researchers to consider this possibility and examine the effect of
human social interactions with intelligent agent programs. There are a variety of types of
social interactions with intelligent agents that could be of interest. The present study will
focus on the effect of one of these possible types, social facilitation.
Social Facilitation Effect
For over a century, the social facilitation effect has been a topic of interest and
research. In 1898, Norman Triplett first documented social facilitation in a study of the
dynamogenic factors in pacemaking and competition. Triplett discovered that children
would wind fishing reels faster when another person was competing with them than when
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performing the same task alone. He concluded that the “bodily presence of another
contestant, participating simultaneously in the race, serves to liberate latent energy not
ordinarily available” (p. 533). Triplett theorized a number of possible reasons for this
phenomenon including encouragement, brain worry, hypnotic suggestion, and automatic
movement.
Researchers since have developed their own theories to explain why the mere
presence of another person can cause an individual to perform differently on a task as
compared to when performing the task alone. Researchers have examined the social
facilitation effect by asking participants to partake in numerous tasks including, but not
limited to, recognition tasks (Zajonc & Sales, 1966), typing tasks (Schmitt, Gilovich,
Goore, & Joseph, 1986), word pair recall tasks (Barron, Moore, & Sanders, 1978), data
entry tasks (Aiello & Kolb, 1995), and anagram solving tasks (Aiello and Svec, 1993).
Experiments that have employed these types of tasks have yielded a variety of findings,
but generally a similar conclusion has been arrived at. When people perform simple
tasks, their performance is enhanced by the presence of another individual. Conversely,
when people perform complex tasks, their performance is inhibited by that same
presence.
Although researchers have generated several lines of evidence demonstrating the
existence of social facilitation, the reasoning behind what causes this effect is debatable.
Researchers have attributed social facilitation to a number of possible causes including
physiological arousal (Zajonc & Sales, 1966), arousal due to evaluation apprehension
(Sanna & Shotland, 1990; Schmitt et al., 1986), arousal due to attentional conflict (Baron
et al., 1978), arousal due to monitoring of others (Guerin & Innes, 1982), and self-
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presentation (Bond, 1982). In what follows, each of these theorized causes will briefly be
detailed in the context of studies that have demonstrated the presence of a social
facilitation effect.
Physiological Arousal
Zajonc (1965) postulated that the mere presence of others could cause an
organism to become physiologically aroused. Evidence at the time suggested that the
mere presence of others was positively correlated with increased adrenal (Thiessen, 1964)
and adrenocortical activity (Mason & Brady, 1964). Furthermore, Zajonc believed that
this physiological arousal would have the same effect as when a person’s generalized
drive is increased. That is, certain responses, dominant responses, would be enhanced
and consequently be more likely to be exhibited by an organism. He based this
hypothesis on the Hull-Spence behavior theory (Hull, 1943; Spence, 1956). This
occurrence is advantageous if the dominant response in a situation happens to be the
correct response, but objectionable if a different response is desired in that situation.
Therefore, when the dominant response in a situation happens to be the correct
one, the presence of another individual may enhance performance by increasing the
likelihood of this correct response. However, when the dominant response is undesired
in that situation, the presence of an individual may retard performance of a task by
causing the individual performing the task to respond in an incorrect manner (the
dominant response being incorrect in that instance). In short, Zajonc used this increase in
arousal, due to the presence of others, to explain the social facilitation effect.
To test this theory, Zajonc and Sales (1966) designed an experiment wherein
“subjects performed a pseudo-recognition task in which their guessing responses were
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based on dominant and subordinate habits” (p. 160). Participants were required to learn a
number of nonsense words shown to them, ostensibly words in Turkish. The amount of
training a participant received differed depending on which group the participant was
assigned to. Participants were exposed to the words 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 times. Next, the
words were tachistoscopically displayed and participants were instructed to try to identify
the words shown.
Subjects participated in one of two task conditions. In one of the task conditions,
the participants performed the recognition task alone. In the other task condition,
participants performed before an audience of two confederates who silently witnessed the
participants’ attempts at word recognition. Zajonc and Sales (1966) hypothesized that the
presence of spectators would increase the arousal of participants, therefore increasing the
production of dominant behaviors. They found that word recognition responses that were
well trained (and therefore were dominant behaviors) benefited from the presence of the
two confederates. However, responses that were not well trained (and therefore were not
dominant behaviors) showed a marked disadvantage when an audience was present.
These results were taken to support Zajonc’s (1965) drive/arousal theory of social
facilitation.
Since then, researchers have sought a plausible reason for why the presence of
others is arousing. Several reasons have been suggested.
Evaluation Apprehension. Some researchers believe that the presence of others
can influence performance on a task, by way of generalized drive, but for a very specific
reason not previously detailed. One such researcher, Cottrell (1972), proposed that what
actually affects human performance on tasks, in the presence of others, is the arousal
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generated by the anticipation of a valenced evaluation based on performance outcomes.
That is, if an individual performs a task in the presence of others that are capable of
evaluating one’s performance positively or negatively, then this individual’s anticipation
of a positive evaluation (because a task is easy) may cause him or her to perform better
than when performing alone. Conversely, if an individual experiences apprehension
about a possible negative evaluation (because a task is difficult), this may cause him or
her to perform worse than when performing alone. Cottrell suggests that if this is the
impetus behind the social facilitation effect, then what causes the arousal that leads to
social facilitation is not the mere presence of an individual per se, but rather the presence
of an individual who is watching and capable of evaluating one’s performance.
Sanna and Shotland (1990) sought to generate evidence in support of this theory.
These researchers designed a study in which participants were asked to perform a series
of memory tasks. These participants were manipulated to believe that they had either
performed very well or very poorly on early tasks. Later, they performed a similar task
either in the presence of an audience or alone. When compared to those performing
alone, participants who believed that they were going to do well, based on prior
experience, performed better than those working alone. Also, participants who were led
to believe that they were going to perform poorly did so when in the presence of others.
Apparently their expectations of a positive or negative evaluation affected their
performance accordingly.
Schmitt et al. (1986) also tested Cottrell’s supposition about evaluation
apprehension as a cause of social facilitation. These researchers designed their study to
be sensitive to the fact that when participants volunteer to be in a study, they may be
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particularly aware that they are being studied by the experimenter and hence, evaluation
apprehension can take place, whether another individual is present or not. To offset this
effect, participants were asked to enter their names and a password composed of their
name backwards with numbers interspersed between the letters into a computer. The
participants were led to believe that this must be done before the actual experiment took
place.
Unbeknownst to the participants, the computer they used to type in this
information recorded their typing speed. Entering their name was treated as a simple task
(which should elicit a dominant behavior) and the password portion was considered a
complicated task (for which no dominant behavior should exist). Participants performed
this task either alone, with a watcher present, or with someone else in the room that
appeared to be attending to something else and hence seemed to be ignoring the
participant. After entering the information into the computer, the experiment ended and
participants were thanked for their participation in the study. Participants seemed to
believe the deception and expressed surprise that the study was over, suggesting that they
may not have been aware of being observed by an experimenter during that particular
portion of the experiment.
Results from the study suggest that the mere presence of an individual was
sufficient to cause the social facilitation effect. Participants who typed the information
with a watcher or with another person present, but ignoring them, exhibited social
facilitation. They typed their name faster and their password slower than the people in
the control condition with nobody present during the tasks. Based on these findings,
Schmitt et al (1986) suggest that, although evaluation apprehension may be sufficient to

27

cause social facilitation, it is not a necessary component for this effect to occur. After all,
the participants seemed be affected by the mere presence of another person that was not
attending to them and consequently incapable of evaluating their behavior.
Attentional Conflict/Distraction. Another line of research in social facilitation
effects suggests that the presence of others is arousing due to attentional conflict or
distraction. Researchers espousing this cause believe that it is the distracting effect that
the presence of others can have on people, which actually causes the increased arousal
that leads to social facilitation (Baron et al., 1978; Sanders & Baron, 1975).
Baron et al. (1978) developed an experiment to test this theory. These researchers
asked participants to learn a list of word pairs and later to try to recall them. Some of the
word pairs were fairly easy to learn, others were more difficult. The participants were
required to recite these word pairs either alone or in the presence of an onlooker. Under
these conditions, the traditional social facilitation effect was exhibited. An additional
measure of level of distraction was taken during the study. After completing the tasks,
participants were asked several questions pertaining to their level of distraction during the
experiment such as, “How frequently did you find your attention was focused on
something other than the task?” and “To what extent was your attention focused on the
learning task during the task period?” (p. 818). A main effect for absence or presence of
an audience on distraction was found. Participants in “audience present” conditions
reported being more distracted from their task when compared to those in the “audience
absent” conditions. People working in the presence of another individual reported being
more distracted, regardless of whether they performed a simple or a complex task.
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Based on this evidence, Baron et al (1978) proposed that the findings documented
in the social facilitation literature were at least partially due to the distracting effects of
having an audience present. These researchers were careful to mention that they had not
established why drive effects were produced when a participant was distracted.
Monitoring of others. Guerin and Innes (1982) believe that social facilitation
simply reflects arousal due to the natural instinct that all creatures have to monitor other
organisms, which are in their presence, for dangerous or potentially threatening behavior.
In their brief review of the social facilitation literature, Guerin and Innes suggest that the
oftentimes-contradictory results of the social facilitation literature can be explained if this
explanation is taken into account.
These theorists believe that when a person finds him or herself in the presence of
another individual, certain aspects of the other individual may cause that person to
monitor him/her: proximity, movement, vocal, facial, postural, and gestural
communication, novelty, and eye gazing behavior. The person is looking for any
possibility of a future or present threat. Consequently, if the other is familiar or similarly
predictable to that person (e.g., if the present individual is blindfolded), very little
monitoring is necessary and therefore, little arousal results from the experience. On the
other hand, Guerin and Innes (1982) suggest that someone arouses us when we feel the
need to prepare to respond to his or her unpredictable, possibly threatening behavior. If
there is no perceived threat, then there is no preparation needed, and hence, no
heightened arousal.
Guerin and Innes (1982) went on to attempt to explain contradictory results in the
social facilitation literature with consideration for this proposed cause. This article did
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not include an empirical test per se, but instead was a reconsideration of past results
under a different assumption. In their survey of past empirical studies, they
demonstrated, rather convincingly, that in instances in which the participants were unable
to monitor and/or predict the behavior of their audiences, participants exhibit the social
facilitation effect. Conversely, in instances where the audiences were predictable and/or
inattentive, they were less likely to. This is a compelling alternative explanation for the
social facilitation effect although still ultimately dependent upon arousal as a cause. It is
merely suggested that the arousal is brought about for a different reason, self-protection.
Self-presentation
Bond (1982) suggests that social facilitation is the result of an individual’s active
regulation of a public image when an audience is present. On the surface, this theory
seems similar to Cottrell’s (1972) evaluation apprehension theory. Bond’s theory differs,
however, in that it does not attribute social facilitation to increased arousal. Rather, Bond
proposes that social facilitation is the result of a performer’s anticipations of either being
able to maintain a positive public self-image or not. Bond suggests that the social
impairment that usually occurs when someone attempts to perform a difficult task in the
presence of others is due to embarrassment. This embarrassment impedes cognitive and
motor control and consequently results in lackluster output.
To test this theory, Bond (1982) asked participants to perform word association
tasks. The difficulty of the tasks was varied. Interestingly, Bond surreptitiously included
some difficult problems amongst the easy ones and included some easy problems
amongst the difficult ones. Hence, a participant in the simple task condition would have
mostly easy word associations but would occasionally be presented with a difficult word
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association. Likewise, a participant in the complex task condition would have mostly
hard word associations, but would occasionally be presented with an easy word
association. Bond’s belief was that a participant performing an easy task would not suffer
embarrassment and would perform better in an effort to maintain a positive public image.
When this participant encounters a difficult word association, he or she will not have
experienced the anticipation of performing poorly, and therefore should not suffer any
impairment. The results supported Bonds’ hypothesis. Participants, who believed that
they were able to do well, did so, even when occasionally given a difficult item.
Conversely, participants who believed that they were going to perform poorly, due to the
embarrassment of performing a difficult task and continually failing in the presence of
another, exhibited impaired performance even when given occasional easy task items
amongst the hard ones. Clearly, the participants’ expectations had some effect on their
performance of the tasks.
Electronic Performance Monitoring and Social Facilitation
A more contemporary line of research relating to social facilitation is the study of
the effect of the “virtual” presence of another. Organizations are increasingly employing
the use of electronic performance monitoring (EPM). EPM enables an employer to
monitor an employee’s work behavior at any time by using a network of computers
and/or cameras. Essentially, EPM allows an employer to spy on employees at will.
Some of the theories about what causes social facilitation effects would suggest that
social facilitation could take place even when someone is simply “watching” you by way
of computer or video camera. If social facilitation is actually the result of evaluation
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apprehension, self-presentation concerns, or distraction, then it would seem likely that
this effect could result when EPM is used by an organization.
Aiello and Svec (1993) designed an experiment to determine whether a person
would perform poorly when being monitored by computer. These researchers asked
participants to perform anagram-solving tasks and to enter their responses into a
computer. Some of the participants performed this task alone, some in the presence of an
audience, and yet others under the impression that someone linked to their computer was
monitoring them. Performance was poor for participants who did the task in the presence
of an audience and participants who were supposedly monitored by computer. Because
Aiello and Svec were interested in demonstrating impairment in the presence of others,
simple tasks were not included in this study. Nonetheless, the results of this study
suggest that impairment due to performing in the presence of others was generalizable to
situations in which someone’s “presence” was merely electronic.
Aiello and Kolb (1995) tested and extended this line of inquiry. These
experimenters studied the effects of EPM on both simple and complex tasks. Their
results supported the findings of previous social facilitation effects studies. That is,
participants who were asked to perform a data entry task for which they were highly
skilled performed better when being monitored electronically. Participants who were
asked to perform the same type of task but who possessed low skill, predictably,
performed worse when monitored by computer.
The results of the previously detailed studies suggest that people perform simple
tasks better and difficult tasks worse when they perceive the presence of another
individual either physically or “virtually.” However, it is also clear that the impetus
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behind the social facilitation effect is highly disputed. It is possible that the effect is the
result of physiological arousal due to evaluation apprehension, distraction, or monitoring
of others. It is also possible that the effect is due to a person’s concerns with selfpresentation. Studies have supported all of these theories to one degree or another.
Regardless of the reason why the social facilitation effect occurs, it is clear that it does
take place and, according to recent research, can occur even when the person watching is
doing so from another location such as by computer. Now we will move on to some
possible moderators of this effect that were considered in this study.
Possible Moderators of Social Facilitation
Locus of Control
Researchers have investigated the effects of a variety of individual differences on
the social facilitation effect. These differences include Type A personality (Gastorf, Suls,
& Sanders, 1980), the need for social approval (Adams, Beatty, & Behnke, 1980), social
anxiety ( Fouts, 1979; Geen, 1991), and locus of control (Aiello & Svec, 1993; Kolb &
Aiello, 1996; Martin & Knight, 1985,). In the present study, locus of control was
considered as one potential moderator of social facilitation.
Locus of control (LOC), first conceptualized by Julian Rotter in the 1950’s, is a
social-cognitive learning theory about the way that people respond to reinforcers in their
environment. Rotter noticed, during his observations of people in therapy, that people
who are exposed to identical conditions for learning can exhibit marked differences in
what they actually learn. Rotter attempted to explain this difference in learning by way
of how a person perceives the connections between cause and effect. Simply put, some
people are able to see the connection between the actions that they take and the
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consequences generated, while others do not seem to be able to accurately distinguish this
relationship (Carver & Scheier, 1996).
Based on his observances, Rotter began to describe people as possessing either an
internal or an external LOC. Rotter postulated that people with a more internal LOC tend
to believe in their ability to make changes in their environment. These people feel more
in control of their lives. However, Rotter suggested that people with a more external
LOC tend to see the reinforcers in their lives as being under the control of others or
occurring by chance. That is to say, people with a more external LOC believe that their
actions have little effect on their environment (Rotter, 1966).
Many lines of research on LOC have tested its relationship with other
psychological effects. Social facilitation is no exception. Speculation about a
relationship between LOC and social facilitation is explicable by the following logic. A
person exhibiting a predominantly external LOC (henceforth referred to as an “external”)
believes that he or she is not in control of the reinforcers in his/her life. If placed in a
social facilitation setting (i.e. performing tasks in the presence of an onlooker) an
“external” may become particularly sensitive to the onlooker’s presence and exhibit a
stronger reaction to his or her presence than someone with a more internal LOC (an
“internal”). Researchers speculate that this sensitivity occurs because externals
oftentimes attribute control to others, rather than to themselves. Internals, on the other
hand, consider themselves in greater control and may therefore exhibit less sensitivity to
the presence of an onlooker. There have been several findings that have supported the
preceding logic (Aiello & Svec, 1993; Martin & Knight, 1985; Rickenberg & Reeves,
2000). Furthermore, others have demonstrated that externals seem to be more sensitive to
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some environmental stressors than internals (Coovert & Goldstein, 1980; Lefcourt,
Miller, Ware, & Sherk, 1981).
Aiello and Svec (1993) demonstrated that people performing a complex task
while being monitored (either by a nearby person or via computer) exhibited the social
facilitation effect. What they also discovered was that externals performing this type of
task experienced significantly greater anxiety than internals in response to being
monitored. Conversely, Kolb and Aiello (1996) found exactly the opposite result in their
study. Externals experienced greater stress when not monitored and internals
experienced greater stress when monitored. It is not clear why these two studies found
opposing results.
Rickenberg and Reeves (2000) found results similar to those of Aiello and Svec
(1993). They had participants perform a difficult computerized task either in the
presence of animated agents (on the computer screen) or without any agents present.
They found that all participants felt more anxiety when agents were present, but anxiety
was highest for externals working with an agent monitoring their work.
In 1985, Martin and Knight found a significant interaction between LOC and
performance in testing conditions. These researchers had participants carry out a simple
paired-associate task either in the presence of an onlooker or alone. They found that
internals performed relatively well regardless of whether an onlooker was present or not
(they did not exhibit the social facilitation effect at all). But externals showed a striking
difference depending on the monitoring condition. If they were not monitored they
performed at a lower level than they would if a person was present. LOC seemed to
moderate the social facilitation effect for these participants. That is, internals did not
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exhibit the effect at all, but externals exhibited the responses that would be expected of
someone performing a simple task either in the presence of another or alone.
So the results to date are somewhat mixed. But one thing seems to be constant
across these studies. Locus of control moderates the social facilitation effect and most of
the time, it is the external that seems to be the most affected by the presence of an
onlooker (Aiello & Svec, 1993; Martin & Knight, 1985; Rickenberg & Reeves, 2000).
Occasionally this influence extends so far as to affect performance on tasks (Martin &
Knight, 1985), but most of the time the interaction between LOC and social facilitation is
exhibited in relation to the amount of stress or anxiety that the observed person
experiences. Thus, externals become most anxious of all when asked to perform while
being monitored (Aiello & Svec, 1993; Rickenberg & Reeves, 2000).
Microcomputer Playfulness
Some theorists propose that computers can promote a state of playfulness in their
operators due to several characteristics computer’s possess including: ease of use, brief
latency of responses, and possession of options that can be customized to an operator’s
preferences (Webster & Martocchio, 1992). Microcomputer playfulness (MCP) is “the
degree of cognitive spontaneity in microcomputer interactions” a person exhibits
(Webster & Martocchio, 1992, p. 201). It is considered to be a situation specific trait.
Webster and Martocchio describe MCP as “a type of intellectual or cognitive playfulness.
It describes an individual’s tendency to interact spontaneously, inventively, and
imaginatively with microcomputers (1992, p. 202).”
The concept of MCP evolved out of the psychological construct “playfulness”
(Barnett, 1991). Playfulness is thought to be a trait that is made up of five factors: sense
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of humor, physical spontaneity, manifest joy, social spontaneity, and cognitive
spontaneity (Barnett, 1991). Webster and Martocchio (1992) decided that the last factor,
cognitive spontaneity, was the most appropriate factor of playfulness to study in relation
to human-computer interaction. These researchers thought that the other four factors
seemed more appropriate for social interactions amongst people only.
People who rate high on MCP have the potential for both positive and negative
experiences relating to this trait. On one hand, Webster and Martocchio (1992) suggest
that people high in MCP may exhibit greater involvement, positive mood, and
satisfaction when operating a computer and consequently may exhibit a greater
motivation to use computers in the future. However, these researchers propose that those
high in MCP may take longer to complete tasks on a computer and may exhibit overinvolvement. For example, a person high in MCP might look for chances to do tasks
other than work on a computer (e.g. play games) and may become distracted with
unimportant aspects of a computer program (e.g. continuously trying different functions
on a program or experimenting with formatting options.) Clearly high MCP has the
potential of being both beneficial and detrimental for a computer user who is trying to
complete a task.
In developing and testing the measure for MCP, the Computer Playfulness Scale,
Webster and Martocchio (1992) hypothesized about numerous correlations to determine
the convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity of the measure. Their results
indicated that people who were rated high in MCP were also high in positive computer
attitudes and computer competence. In addition, these researchers found that MCP was
negatively correlated with computer anxiety and positively correlated with positive
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affect, satisfaction during computer use, and other outcome measures. Test-retest
reliability was found to be .85 (p<.001) at an interval of three months and this was taken
as evidence of MCP’s trait-like quality. Based on the preceding evidence, it seems
logical to suppose that MCP may very well be a stable trait that is associated with
positive attitudes towards computers and may be indicative of a lack of computer anxiety.
Computer users who are high in MCP tend to react positively when they work with a
computer. The stability of this construct was tested again by Yager, Kappelman, Maples,
and Prybutok (1997) who also found the Computer Playfulness Scale to be reliable over
several administrations with a mean r = .81 (p<.001).
Several research projects have been conduced to understand the relationship
between MCP and computers. For example, Atkinson and Kydd (1997) tested whether
computer users who were rated high in playfulness (from which MCP is derived) were
more likely to embrace and use the World Wide Web (WWW). They found that
playfulness was indeed positively correlated with WWW use. From this, one might
speculate that the attribute of playfulness in participants could encourage computer use
and buffer fears or anxieties one might have about using a computer to explore the
WWW. In fact, Bozionelos and Bozionelos (1997) tested the relationship between
playfulness and computer anxiety specifically. These researchers also found that
playfulness and computer anxiety were negatively correlated. They concluded that those
high in playfulness “have an advantage in terms of experiencing less anxiety when they
use computers (p. 957).”
Some researchers who have investigated the effects of MCP (or its close relative
playfulness) have done so in relation to training in computers (Martocchio & Webster,
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1992; Potosky, 2002) with the finding that those high in playfulness tend to experience
more positive outcomes (test performance or post-training programming efficacy
judgments) from training. However, MCP’s negative association with computer anxiety
and its positive correlation with involvement and positive mood during computer use
suggest that MCP may have effects beyond training scenarios. Speaking to this issue,
Woszczynski, Roth, and Segars (2002) proposed an integrated theory of playfulness in
computer interactions. As a part of their model, these researchers projected that
computer users that are high in playfulness will experience temporary states of
playfulness (compared to Csikszentmihalyi’s 1975 theory of flow) that will result in
increased satisfaction, computer proficiency, and innovative behaviors during computer
use.
It was possible that the microcomputer playfulness trait, which is associated with
several positive outcomes in computer use, would have a moderating effect on
performance and anxiety during a social facilitation type scenario on a computer. It was
possible that individuals high in MCP would experience less anxiety when required to
perform a task on a computer that has an IA present due to their playful approach to
computer technology. However, whether this reduction in anxiety would affect
performance was unclear.
Summary and Hypotheses
Given the importance of computers in the workplace, the growing popularity of
intelligent agent computer support, and the evidence suggesting that people mindlessly
react to computers according to identifiable social conventions, it would behoove
researchers to investigate our responses to intelligent agents. Social facilitation is one
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social effect that could affect computer users should they find themselves performing
tasks on a computer with an intelligent agent installed. Furthermore, it is likely that
individual differences such as locus of control and microcomputer playfulness may
moderate the effects that an intelligent agent may have on a person. It is with this in
mind that the following research hypotheses were proposed:
Hypothesis 1: Participants will exhibit the social facilitation effect when
performing a task on a computer that has an intelligent agent operating. Simple
tasks will result in a greater number of correct responses and complex tasks will
result in a greater number of incorrect responses when compared to a control
condition.
Hypothesis 2: Participants will exhibit greater arousal (as measured by
Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene’s 1970 state anxiety scale) when performing a
task on a computer that has an intelligent agent operating (due to the arousing
effects of having an “onlooker” witnessing one’s performance.)
Hypothesis 3: The amount of arousal exhibited while performing a task on a
computer with an intelligent agent operating will vary depending on whether the
agent appears to be actively monitoring the participant or not. That is, an
apparently idle agent, not attending to participant behavior, will elicit less arousal
than an openly monitoring agent.
Hypothesis 4: Participants’ level of arousal will be moderated by their locus of
control trait. Participants that are predominantly external in locus of control will
exhibit greater arousal as a result of the intelligent agent’s presence during tasks
than participants that are more internal in locus of control.
Hypothesis 5: Participants’ level of arousal will be moderated by their
microcomputer playfulness trait. Participants that are high in microcomputer
playfulness will exhibit less arousal as a result of the intelligent agent’s presence
during tasks than participants that are low in microcomputer playfulness.
Exploratory question 1: Will a participant’s performance on the computerized
tasks be moderated by locus of control?
Exploratory question 2: Will a participant’s performance on the computerized
tasks be moderated by microcomputer playfulness?
Exploratory question 3: Will an agent, believed to be monitoring a participant
from a nearby networked computer, cause participants to exhibit the social
facilitation effect?
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Chapter Two: Method
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students from the University of South Florida.
They were recruited online (using etoolkit) by offering the opportunity to earn extra
credit in undergraduate psychology classes. No attempt was made to gather an equal
proportion of males to females in this study, as gender was not a variable under
consideration. Due to the population of psychology students at the university, females
were expected to be over represented in the study. It was anticipated that 84 participants
would be necessary for the study (21 per between-subjects condition) as suggested in
Cohen and Cohen (1983, p. 59-61) for experiments involving medium effect sizes. The
actual number of participants what were included in the study was 103, nineteen more
than were proposed. As expected, participants were mostly female (92%). Furthermore,
participants were composed primarily of 22 year old, Caucasian (43.7%), college level
juniors (37%).
Most participants indicated little if any prior knowledge about intelligent agents
(M=2.97, SD=2.62, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 with 10 indicating much experience
with intelligent agents) and only moderate experience at data entry type tasks (M=5.36,
SD=2.96, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 with 10 indicating much data entry experience).
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Procedure
Participants were run one at a time, in isolation. When participants arrived for the
study, they were escorted to a small private room. This room had a door and provided
complete privacy during the main experimental conditions. Participants were seated
before a computer. The experimenter explained that the experiment was designed to
study how people behaved while working on computers. Participants were to perform
two short computerized tasks and their performance would be recorded for later analysis.
Next, they were asked to read and sign an informed consent form.
After they signed the informed consent, they were asked to fill out an online
questionnaire. They filled out a questionnaire designed to measure microcomputer
playfulness (see Appendix A) and some demographic variables (see Appendix B). Data
collected by the questionnaires was recorded electronically and, upon completion of the
questionnaires, was sent via email to a preset email account. The data collected in this
manner did not contain the participants’ names. Instead it contained a pre-assigned code
number for identification.
Depending on which agent condition participants were assigned to, some
participants viewed a computerized introduction to intelligent agents. This consisted of a
computerized agent appearing on the monitor and explaining aloud what intelligent
agents are, their purpose, and their importance. However, participants in the control
condition received a filler task during that time period instead of the computerized
introduction to intelligent agents.
Finally, participants in the remotely monitored condition received the same IA
introduction, but on a different computer than the one that they would be performing the
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computerized tasks on. This was done to emphasize to participants that monitoring was
to take place from a different location than the computer that the participant was
performing the computerized task on. In other words, there was concern that if
participants received the IA introduction on the same computer that they performed the
computerized tasks, they might not believe that they were being monitored by that agent
from another computer. Using separate computers for the introduction and tasks, in this
condition only, was thought to make the “remote monitoring” more salient to
participants.
In the three conditions that supposedly involved intelligent agent monitoring (all
but the control condition) the participants were deceived. They were told that the agent
was observing their onscreen behavior and recording their responses. In reality, the agent
was simply responding to specific mouse button clicks. For example, when the
participants clicked on the “save” button, the agent appeared to look in the direction of
the button and write something down on a piece of paper. It was important that
participants felt as if the agent was watching their onscreen behaviors. This was
necessary to generate the appropriate arousal that might result in the social facilitation
effect.
After the introduction to intelligent agents was complete, the experimenter guided
participants through a short practice session to ensure that they fully understood the
simple and complex tasks that they were to perform. During the practice sessions, no
agent was present. After participants were able to demonstrate an understanding of the
tasks, they were ready to begin the experiment. Understanding of the tasks was assumed
when a participant was able to complete a trial of entries successfully.
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Next, participants performed the simple and complex tasks in the isolated room
alone. At no time during the experimental condition was another person present. In the
control condition, tasks were performed without any agent onscreen. In the idle agent
condition, tasks were performed with an agent present that appeared to be ignoring the
participants. Regardless of a participant’s onscreen actions, the agent would appear to
yawn, avoid responding to participants, and generally ignore them until it fell asleep. In
the monitoring agent condition, tasks were performed with an agent present that appeared
to be actively watching the participants. The agent appeared to look at participants, turn
its head to watch data being entered into onscreen fields, and react to onscreen button
clicks. Finally, in the remotely monitoring agent condition, tasks were performed
without any agent present. Participants were told that they are being monitored by an
intelligent agent that was present on another computer that was networked to the one that
participants were working on. Participants were asked to perform two timed
computerized tasks: a simple numerical data entry task and a more difficult task that
involved both data entry and some more complicated tasks. Those more complicated
tasks included the looking up of data in a chart and the computation of two short
mathematical formulae. As participants carried out the computerized tasks, performance
data was recorded electronically and, upon completion of the tasks, sent via email to a
preset email account.
During both computerized tasks, at preset times, a questionnaire designed to
measure participants’ level of state anxiety appeared on the screen for participants to fill
out (see Appendix C). This occurred three times during each task. This data was
transmitted electronically along with the performance data at the end of both tasks.
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Figure 1: Screen Shot of the Computerized Task

Between the simple and complex tasks, participants were instructed to fill out an
additional online questionnaire that measured locus of control (see Appendix D). It was
presented between tasks both to collect the data of interest on locus of control and to give
participants a break between tasks and hopefully relax a bit.
When both tasks were complete, participants were instructed onscreen to inform
the experimenter that they were finished. The experimenter then asked them to complete
a manipulation check and follow-up questionnaire online (see Appendix E). Data
collected by the questionnaires was recorded electronically and, upon completion of the
questionnaires, sent via email to a preset email account. Finally, participants were
debriefed. The experimenter explained the purpose of the study to the participants and
asked them not to discuss it or the manipulations involved with anyone else.
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Measures
Performance was measured as the number of correct responses made during the
computerized tasks. As there were six data fields to input, responses for each field were
collected to be analyzed both separately and as an aggregate.
Microcomputer playfulness was measured using Webster and Martocchio’s
(1992) Microcomputer Playfulness Questionnaire. This questionnaire is a 7-item, Likert
type scale composed of adjectives that participants use to indicate how they characterize
themselves while using computers (see Appendix A).
Locus of control was measured using the Spheres of Control Scale developed by
Paulhus (1990). This scale is a 30-item, Likert type scale that is designed to measure
three dimensions of locus of control: personal control, interpersonal control, and sociopolitical control. For the purposes of this study, 20 of the items were used. Specifically,
10 items that measured personal control and 10 items that measured interpersonal control
(See Appendix D).
Arousal was measured using the portion of Spielberger’s (1970) State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) that measures state anxiety. This modified version only
contained 10 of the 20 items originally intended to measure state anxiety. The items ask
participants to report how strongly they feel at the time by rating their feelings on a 4point scale with choices that range from “not at all” to “very much so” (See Appendix C).
Additionally, several demographic questions were asked of participants.
Specifically, participants were asked to indicate their gender, age, education level, and
ethnicity. Also, several items specifically aimed at determining a participant’s
knowledge of and experience with intelligent agents measured intelligent agent
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experience. Also, a manipulation check was performed. Participants were asked to
indicate whether they believed they were being monitored during the computerized tasks.
This was measured to be certain that participants believed that the agent was watching
them and monitoring their performance (in the monitoring agent and remotely monitoring
agent conditions) or not (in the no agent and idle agent conditions) (See Appendix B).
Apparatus
This study involved the use of two computers. A computer was used to
administer one of the initial online questionnaires that all participants were asked to fill
out at the experiment’s beginning. That same computer was used to introduce the
intelligent agent to participants that were assigned to the agent conditions (all except
control).
The other computer was located in a private room and was used for the
computerized tasks that participants were asked to perform, measurement of locus of
control, and the follow up questionnaire/manipulation check. The computerized tasks
took place on a web page that had been designed specifically for this study (see figure 4).
The web page was created to resemble a screen shot from a computerized payroll
application. It consisted of an image of a computer monitor and a separate section in
which data is generated. The computer monitor image included several text fields that
participants entered data into and several buttons that participants had to click with their
mouse during the tasks. Also on the computer monitor image (in idle and monitoring
intelligent agent conditions) was a small animated cartoon wizard that represented the
intelligent agent. The wizard performed specific actions during the task depending on the
experimental condition (as explained in the procedure above).
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Data was randomly generated by the computer and appeared before participants in
the data section of the screen. Participants used this data to complete the simple and
complex tasks.
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Chapter Three: Results
Specific Hypotheses and Results in Brief
The following hypotheses are addressed by the forthcoming analyses. This list is
repeated at the end of the results section for the reader’s convenience.
Hypothesis 1 (Participants will exhibit the social facilitation effect when
performing a task on a computer that has an intelligent agent operating. Simple
tasks will result in a greater number of correct responses and complex tasks will
result in a greater number of incorrect responses when compared to a control
condition.) is not supported.
Hypothesis 2 (Participants will exhibit greater arousal, as measured by
Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene’s 1970 state anxiety scale, when performing a
task on a computer that has an intelligent agent operating.) is not supported.
Hypothesis 3 (The amount of arousal exhibited while performing a task on
a computer with an intelligent agent operating will vary depending on whether the
agent appears to be actively monitoring the participant or not. That is, an
apparently idle agent, not attending to participant behavior, will elicit less arousal
than an openly monitoring agent.) is not supported.
Hypothesis 4 (Participants’ level of arousal will be moderated by their
locus of control trait. Participants that are predominantly external in locus of
control will exhibit greater arousal as a result of the intelligent agent’s presence
during tasks than participants that are more internal in locus of control.) is not
supported.
Hypothesis 5 (Participants’ level of arousal will be moderated by their
microcomputer playfulness trait. Participants that are high in microcomputer
playfulness will exhibit less arousal as a result of the intelligent agent’s presence
during tasks than participants that are low in microcomputer playfulness.) is
partially supported.
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Repeated Measures Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA)
A 2 x 4 Difficulty (simple and complex) x Agent (control, idle, active, and
remote) repeated measures MANOVA was conducted on task performance and arousal.
Difficulty was the within-subjects (WS) variable and Agent was the between-subjects
(BS) variable. Following the MANOVA, a 2 x 4 Difficulty (simple and complex) x
Agent (control, idle, active, and remote) repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was conducted on task performance and arousal separately.
Rationale. A repeated measures MANOVA was used to analyze the data because
this is a mixed design (one BS variable and WS variable) with two dependent variables.
Rather than simply performing two ANOVAs, one MANOVA was used in an attempt to
keep familywise error to a minimum.
Agent condition. There is not a significant Agent multivariate main effect, F(6,
198) = .99, p > .05. Neither is there a significant Agent main effect for the univariate
analysis on task performance F(3, 99) = .90, p > .05, nor on arousal F(3, 99) = 1.19, p >
.05.
Difficulty condition. There is a significant Difficulty multivariate main effect,
F(2, 98) = 718.36, p < .01. There is a significant Difficulty main effect for the univariate
analyses on both task performance F(1, 99) = 1440.97, p < .01, and arousal F(1, 99) =
8.67, p < .01. Post hoc analyses are not necessary because Difficulty only has two levels.
The Simple condition results in significantly greater task performance (M = 43.78, SD =
9.13) than the Complex condition (M = 19.40, SD = 5.25). Furthermore, the Simple
condition results in significantly less arousal (M = 15.77, SD = 5.19) than the Complex
condition (M = 16.81, SD = 5.48).
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Agent x Difficulty condition. There is not a significant Agent x Difficulty
multivariate interaction effect, F(6, 198) = .74, p > .05. Additionally there is neither a
significant Agent x Difficulty interaction effect for the univariate analysis on task
performance F(3, 99) = .07, p > .05, nor on arousal F(3, 99) = 1.31, p > .05.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Agent and Difficulty
Control (n = 26)
Simple
Complex
Idle agent (n = 27)
Simple
Complex
Active agent (n = 25)
Simple
Complex
Remote agent (n = 25)
Simple
Complex

M (and SD) mean task
performance

M (and SD) mean participant
arousal

44.00 (11.40)
19.23 (6.31)

16.75 (5.70)
16.88 (4.81)

44.85 (9.98)
20.44 (5.73)

14.33 (4.41)
15.13 (4.81)

41.76 (7.13)
17.80 (4.58)

15.74 (5.32)
17.84 (6.60)

44.40 (7.35)
20.04 (3.87)

16.34 (5.24)
17.52 (5.47)

Repeated Measures Multivariate Analyses of Covariance (MANCOVA)
A 2 x 4 Difficulty (simple and complex) x Agent (control, idle, active, and
remote) repeated measures MANCOVA was conducted on task performance and arousal
with locus of control (LOC) and microcomputer playfulness (MCP) included in the
analysis as covariates. Following the MANCOVA, separate 2 x 4 Difficulty (simple and
complex) x Agent (control, idle, actively monitoring, and remotely monitoring) repeated
measures ANCOVAs were conducted on task performance and arousal with LOC and
MCP included in the analysis as covariates.
Rationale. Repeated measures MANCOVA is used to further analyze the data
because it is necessary to test for the potentially moderating effects of LOC and MCP,
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which are continuous variables. When data is being analyzed that contains both
continuous and categorical independent variables, oftentimes ANCOVA is used.
Because there are two dependent variables, a MANCOVA is used in an attempt to keep
familywise error to a minimum.
When a significant interaction between a continuous and categorical variable
occurs, this is indication of moderation (Pedhazur, 1997). In that case, further tests must
be carried out to investigate the relationship between the variables of interest (see Testing
for Moderation below).
Agent condition. There is not a significant Agent multivariate main effect, F(6,
182) = 1.02, p > .05. Moreover there is neither a significant Agent main effect for the
univariate analysis on task performance F(3, 91) = .21, p > .05, nor on arousal F(3, 91) =
1.85, p > .05.
Difficulty condition. There is a significant Difficulty multivariate main effect,
F(2, 90) = 5.93, p < .01. Like the results of the MANOVA, there is still a significant
Difficulty main effect for the univariate analysis on task performance F(1, 91) = 11.18, p
< .01. Post hoc analyses are not necessary because Difficulty only has two levels.
Unlike the results of the MANOVA, there is no longer a significant Difficulty main effect
for the univariate analysis on arousal F(1, 91) = .17, p > .05 when LOC and MCP are
controlled for in the MANCOVA.
LOC condition. There is a significant LOC multivariate main effect, F(2, 90) =
4.49, p < .05. There is not a significant LOC main effect for the univariate analysis on
task performance F(1, 91) = .34, p > .05. But there is a significant LOC main effect for
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the univariate analysis on arousal F(1, 91) = 9.03, p < .01. This is because LOC and
arousal are negatively correlated (see Other Interesting Findings below).
MCP condition. There is not a significant MCP multivariate main effect, F(2, 90)
= .02, p > .05. Furthermore there is neither a significant MCP main effect for the
univariate analysis on task performance F(1, 91) = .36, p > .05, nor on arousal F(1, 91) =
.07, p > .05.
Agent x Difficulty condition. There is not a significant Agent x Difficulty
multivariate interaction effect, F(6, 182) = .47, p > .05. Also there is neither a significant
Agent x Difficulty interaction effect for the univariate analysis on task performance F(3,
91) = .43, p > .05, nor on arousal F(3, 91) = .60, p > .05.
Agent x LOC condition. There is not a significant Agent x LOC multivariate
interaction effect, F(6, 182) = .53, p > .05. In addition there is neither a significant Agent
x LOC interaction effect for the univariate analysis on task performance F(3, 91) = .20, p
> .05, nor on arousal F(3, 91) = .79, p > .05.
Agent x MCP condition. There is a significant Agent x MCP multivariate
interaction effect, F(6, 182) = 2.34, p < .05. There is not a significant Agent x MCP
interaction effect for the univariate analysis on task performance F(3, 91) = .1.47, p > .05.
But there is a significant Agent x MCP interaction effect for the univariate analysis on
arousal F(3, 91) = 3.08, p < .05.
Difficulty x LOC condition. There is not a significant Difficulty x LOC
multivariate interaction effect, F(2, 90) = .08, p > .05. What's more, there is neither a
significant Difficulty x LOC interaction effect for the univariate analysis on task
performance F(1, 91) = .08, p > .05, nor on arousal F(1, 91) = .06, p > .05.
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Difficulty x MCP condition. There is not a significant Difficulty x MCP
multivariate interaction effect, F(2, 90) = .55, p > .05. Also there is neither a significant
Difficulty x MCP interaction effect for the univariate analysis on task performance F(1,
91) = .69, p > .05, nor on arousal F(1, 91) = .59, p > .05.
Agent x Difficulty x LOC condition. There is not a significant Agent x Difficulty
x LOC multivariate interaction effect, F(6, 182) = .43, p > .05. Also there is neither a
significant Agent x Difficulty x LOC interaction effect for the univariate analysis on task
performance F(3, 91) = .17, p > .05, nor on arousal F(3, 91) = .76, p > .05.
Agent x Difficulty x MCP condition. There is not a significant Agent x Difficulty
x MCP multivariate interaction effect, F(6, 182) = .39, p > .05. Moreover there is neither
a significant Agent x Difficulty x MCP interaction effect for the univariate analysis on
task performance F(3, 91) = .57, p > .05, nor on arousal F(3, 91) = .22, p > .05.
Testing for Moderation
The repeated measures MANCOVA revealed a significant Agent x MCP
interaction. Therefore it is necessary to further investigate this finding. First, because
there is no main effect of difficulty on arousal when controlling for the two covariates,
the two arousal scores for each participant are averaged to form one mean arousal score
for each participant in the study.
Second, using multiple regression, Arousal is regressed on Agent, MCP, and a
multiplicative term representing the Agent x MCP interaction (Pedhazur, 1997). This
results in the unstandardized regression equation: Arousal = 28.94 – 4.95(Agent) –
0.37(MCP) + 0.15(Agent x MCP). This regression equation is not significant, F(3, 102)
= 1.52, p > .05. However the parameter estimates indicate that the interaction term is
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significant at p < .05, as previously indicated by the MANCOVA. Therefore it is
justifiable to conduct further regression analyses for each level of Agent as suggested by
Pedhazur.
Third, in order to further test the interaction, the data is split into four groups
based on the four Agent conditions (control, idle, active, and remote). Next, four
separate regression analyses are conducted, one for each Agent condition. Consequently,
Arousal is regressed on MCP four times. This results in four unstandardized regression
equations. The control condition unstandardized regression equation, Arousal = 21.50 –
0.13(MCP), is not significant, F(1, 25) = 0.97, p > .05. But the idle condition
unstandardized regression equation, Arousal = 30.88 – 0.44(MCP), is significant, F(1,
26) = 13.27, p < .01. The active condition unstandardized regression equation, Arousal =
7.95 + 0.25(MCP), is not significant, F(1, 24) 3.58, p = .07. It is, however, approaching
significance. Finally, the remote condition unstandardized regression equation, Arousal
= 16 + 0.03(MCP), is not significant, F(1, 24) = 0.01, p > .05.
Figure 2: Scatterplot of MCP x Arousal
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Chi-squares and One-way ANOVAs to Test Agent Group Equality
Chi-square analyses were used to establish whether statistically significant
differences existed between agent conditions on several potentially relevant participant
characteristics that are measured categorically. Agent condition groups are equally
proportioned by ethnicity (χ2 (15, N = 103) = 14.71, p > .05), gender (χ2 (3, N = 103) =
1.93, p > .05), and year in college (χ2 (12, N = 103) = 12.08, p > .05).
Finally, one-way ANOVAs were used to establish whether statistically significant
differences existed between agent conditions on two potentially relevant participant
characteristics that were measured on a continuous scale. Agent condition groups are
equally proportioned in terms of prior data entry experience F(3, 102) = .27, p > .05 and
prior experience with intelligent agents F(3, 102) = 2.58, p > .05.
Other Interesting Findings
The post task questionnaire allowed for a number of additional analyses of
interest to be conducted. Chi-square, ANOVA, and correlational analyses were used, as
needed, to determine that which follows.
In the post task questionnaire, participants are asked, “During the computerized
tasks that you worked on, did you feel as if your performance was being monitored?”
Across all four Agent conditions, participants answer similarly (χ2 (3, N = 103) = 2.55, p
> .05). Answers to this yes or no question reveal that 70% of all participants feel as if
their performance is being monitored in some way. Also, their responses correlate
significantly with arousal scores (r = -.24, p < .05), such that those indicating that they
feel they are being monitored report greater arousal during the tasks (M = 17.08, SD =
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5.41) than those indicating that they do not feel that they are being monitored (M = 14.46,
SD = 3.36).
In the post task questionnaire, participants are asked to, “Please indicate how
much you felt as if your behavior was being watched during the computerized tasks.”
Answers are of a 5-point Likert scale format with 1 meaning “Not at all” and 5 meaning
“Very much”. Across all four Agent conditions, participants answer similarly F(3, 102)
= .57, p > .05. Means reveal that at least 86% of all participants feel that their behavior is
being watched to one degree or another. Also, their responses correlate significantly with
arousal scores (r = .30, p < .01), such that those indicating that they felt very much that
their behavior was being watched report greater arousal during the tasks (M = 21.17, SD
= 4.01) than those indicating that they do not feel that they were being watched (M =
14.43, SD = 5.16).
In the post task questionnaire, participants are asked, “How did you feel about the
intelligent agent during the computerized tasks?” Answers are on a 5-point Likert scale
with low scores indicating dislike and high scores indicating that a participant liked the
agent. Participants indicate equal levels of liking for the idle and active agents, F(1, 51)
= .87, p > .05. However, their responses correlate significantly with arousal scores (r = .35, p < .05), such that those indicating that they really liked the agent report less arousal
during the tasks (M = 13.15, SD = 2.48) than those indicating that they dislike it (M =
18.58, SD = 6.79).
In the post task questionnaire, participants are asked, “How distracting was the
intelligent agent during the computerized tasks?” Answers are on a 5-point Likert scale
with low scores indicating little distraction from the agent and high scores indicating that

57

the participant found the agent very distracting. Participants indicate that the idle and
active agents are equally distracting, F(1, 51) = 1.04, p > .05. However, their responses
correlate significantly with arousal scores (r = .38, p , .01), such that those indicating that
they find the agent very distracting report greater arousal during the tasks (M = 19.88, SD
= 5.83) than those indicating that they do not find the agent distracting (M = 13.65, SD =
4.10)
In the post task questionnaire, participants are asked, “During the computerized
tasks that you worked on, at what point did you stop paying attention to the intelligent
agent?” Answers are of a 5-point Likert scale format with low scores indicating that the
participant claims to have stopped paying attention to the agent early in the tasks and
high scores indicating that the participant claims to have attended to the agent for a
longer period of time. Participants indicate that they stop attending to the idle and active
agents at approximately the same time, F(1, 51) = 1.97, p > .05. Furthermore, 63% of all
participants indicate that they stop attending to the agent within a couple of minutes of
the task’s start.
Finally, a number of interesting correlations worthy of mention were found while
analyzing the data. LOC correlates negatively with participants’ self-reported
perceptions of difficulty of the computerized tasks. LOC correlates negatively with how
hard participants believed the simple task to be (r = -.20, p < .05) and with how hard they
believe the complex task to be (r = -.21, p < .05). Therefore, the more internal a person’s
LOC, the easier they perceive the computerized tasks to be. Also, LOC correlates
negatively with participants’ arousal during the computerized tasks (r = -.35, p < .01).
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The more internal a participants’ LOC, the less arousal they report experiencing during
the tasks.
Microcomputer playfulness correlates positively with participants’ self-report of
when they stop attending to the agent during the computerized tasks (r = .20, p < .05).
Therefore, the more playful a participant is when working on computers, the longer they
report attending to the agent during the computerized tasks.
Specific Hypotheses and Results Summary
In review, the following hypotheses were addressed by the analyses. This is
simply an abbreviated recap of that originally pointed out at the beginning of the results
section.
Hypothesis 1 (Participants will exhibit the social facilitation effect when
performing a task on a computer that has an intelligent agent operating.) was not
supported.
Hypothesis 2 (Participants will exhibit greater arousal when performing a
task on a computer that has an intelligent agent operating.) was not supported.
Hypothesis 3 (The amount of arousal exhibited while performing a task on
a computer with an intelligent agent operating will vary depending on whether the
agent appears to be actively monitoring the participant or not.) was not supported.
Hypothesis 4 (Participants’ level of arousal will be moderated by their
locus of control trait.) was not supported.
Hypothesis 5 (Participants’ level of arousal will be moderated by their
microcomputer playfulness trait.) was partially supported.
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Chapter Four: Discussion
Summary of Results
Intelligent agents (IA) have the potential to become a technological marvel. They
are capable of assisting computer users in numerous helpful ways. Despite their already
impressive level of ability, it is predicted that agents of the future will be even more
capable, more able to assist users, more able to automate routine functions, and will be
far more life-like. Indeed there may come a day when intelligent agent technology is
truly ubiquitous, with an anthropomorphized IA on every computer screen, watching,
learning, and automating a person’s computerized tasks. This, of course, leads one to ask
how people will respond to them.
Will the presence of a human-like IA on computers affect the way people use
them? Will a person’s performance suffer, or perhaps improve, as a result of IA
involvement in computerized activities? Will a person experience a certain level of
heightened anxiety when faced with a computerized agent that is interacting with them in
a very personal way? Furthermore, will individual differences affect a person’s reactions
to an IA? Will there be some people who respond well to IAs while others do not? What
will cause them to differ? Or will people simply find themselves unaffected by IAs in all
but the most superficial of ways? This thesis set out to begin investigating these
questions.
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The presence of an IA on a computer screen during a computerized task was
expected to cause people to exhibit the social facilitation effect. In other words, people
were expected to perform simple tasks better and complex tasks worse when there was an
IA present on screen during the execution of the task. It was also proposed that merely
being aware that an IA was remotely monitoring one’s performance might cause one to
exhibit social facilitation. The data failed to support these hypotheses. Participants
performing a computerized task exhibited equivalent performance regardless of whether
an intelligent agent was on screen or not. All participants, regardless of which agent
condition they found themselves in, performed alike.
Because many researchers have proposed that the presence of an onlooker during
task performance causes one to experience an increase in physiological arousal (for a
number of proposed reasons), it was expected that people would experience an increase
in physiological arousal when they performed the previously mentioned computerized
tasks with an IA present. Also, it was proposed that the specific behavior of the IA might
have an effect on someone’s physiological arousal. It was anticipated that an IA that
appeared idle, apparently ignoring the actions of a computer user, might cause a person to
experience less physiological arousal than a more active IA, one that appeared to
carefully watch what the user was doing on the computer. However, the data failed to
support these hypotheses. Participants performing a computerized task exhibited
equivalent physiological arousal (measured as state stress) regardless of whether an
intelligent agent was on screen or not. Furthermore, the specific behaviors of the agent
seemed to leave a participant’s arousal unaffected. Consequently all participants,

61

regardless of which agent condition they found themselves in, seem to have experienced
the same levels of arousal.
It has been suggested by past researchers that certain personality characteristics
relate to one’s experience of stress. Some people seem to respond well to stressors,
others less so. Two personality characteristics in particular were investigated in this
study due to their purported relationship with stress and feelings of computer anxiety,
locus of control and microcomputer playfulness respectively. It was proposed that as
people differ on these two traits, they might respond to the onscreen presence of an IA
differently. Specifically, it was hypothesized that those participants who possess a more
external locus of control might experience greater arousal, and perhaps a change in task
performance, as a result of the presence of an IA than those who possess a more internal
locus of control. In addition, it was proposed that those participants who possess a more
playful attitude when working with computers might experience less anxiety, and
therefore less arousal, as a result of the presence of an IA. This too might affect a user’s
computerized task performance. These moderating effects are considered separately
next.
The data suggests that locus of control, although not a moderator of the effects of
IAs on arousal or task performance, nonetheless does relate to someone’s experience of
arousal while performing a computerized task. When efforts were made to control for a
person’s locus of control, the effects of a task’s difficulty on arousal changed. When
considered without taking a person’s locus of control into account, the difficulty of the
computerized tasks had a direct effect on a participant’s arousal. In other words, people
experienced more arousal when performing the more complex task than they did when
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performing the simpler one. However, when locus of control was controlled for, the
effects of difficulty on arousal were undetectable. Apparently the differences in arousal,
based on the difficulty of the tasks, were merely the result of a person’s locus of control
rather than how difficult the tasks were. Furthermore, it was found that there was a
negative relationship between locus of control and a person’s overall arousal experienced
during the study. Those individuals possessing a more internal locus of control
experienced less arousal during the tasks.
Finally, the data suggests that microcomputer playfulness (MCP) does not
moderate the effect of IAs on task performance but may in fact moderate the effect of IAs
on arousal. When MCP was controlled for, the effects of an IA on a participant’s arousal
were different. Originally, without controlling for MCP, IAs appeared to have no effect
on a person’s arousal while performing a computerized task. Furthermore, MCP
appeared to be unrelated to arousal. However, when the data was separated into its four
conditions (representing the four levels of the Agent independent variable), one
condition, the idle agent condition, revealed a relationship between MCP and arousal. In
fact, in the idle condition those who possessed a more playful attitude towards computers
appeared to experience less arousal/stress during the computerized tasks. Conversely,
those with a less playful attitude appeared to have experienced greater arousal/stress
during the task.
Also, in the active agent condition, the data suggests that another interesting
relationship between MCP and arousal might exist. Although the relationship was not
statistically significant, it was approaching significance and merits attention. In the
active condition those who possessed a more playful attitude towards computers appeared
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to experience more arousal/stress during the computerized tasks and those with a less
playful attitude appeared to have experienced less arousal/stress during the task. This
disordinal relationship between MCP and arousal, depending upon the behavior of the IA,
is an interesting discovery.
Two additional unexpected relationships were discovered while analyzing the
data. LOC was found to be negatively correlated with how hard participants reportedly
perceived the computerized tasks to be. Those participants who possessed a more
internal LOC appear to have found the tasks to be easier than those who possessed a more
external LOC. Also, MCP was found to be negatively correlated with how long
participants reportedly attended to the intelligent agent on the computer screen.
Participants who describe themselves as possessing a more playful attitude when using
computers found themselves attending to the IA for a longer period of time during the
tasks. Those with a less playful attitude attended to the IA for a shorter period of time.
Explanations for Findings
Agents on performance and arousal. In this study, IAs were found to leave a
participant’s performance on a computerized task and physiological arousal relatively
unaffected. Participants carried out two tasks, of varying difficulty. If the social
facilitation effect had taken effect, according to theory, then participants would have
performed the simpler task better and their performance of the more difficulty task would
have been worsened. The results, however, suggest that an IA doesn’t affect someone’s
computerized performance or arousal one whit, regardless of how it behaves.
One possible explanation for this result is that current IAs don’t exhibit enough of
the traits that are required to trigger the mindlessness that leads to social reactions to
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computers. It has been suggested that in order for a computer to cause one to mindlessly
respond socially to it, it must exhibit three traits: use of language, interactivity, and the
assumption of a traditionally human role. IAs, at present, are infrequently programmed
to use audible verbal output. Their output is typically presented in the form of “word
balloons.” Much like the dialogue of comic strips, when an IA communicates with a
computer user, it is usually programmed to present readable text appearing beside it. The
IA in this experiment is no exception. Even if audible verbal output is used, it is often
difficult to understand. Technology is improving, but at present the voice of an IA often
resembles a synthesizer version of human speech. This results in a clearly non-human
sounding dialogue that is often difficult to completely understand without the assistance
of a “word balloon” presenting the dialogue beside it. Additionally, the interactivity of
an agent sometimes appears quite artificial. It doesn’t take much insight for a user to
quickly realize that an IA is appearing and initiating contact due to some pre-arranged
condition. For example, the paper clip IA that appears in Microsoft Word will always
appear when a person begins a document with the words “Dear” and then offers to format
the document. Although this offer of assistance is welcome, and sometimes useful, it
probably doesn’t create the illusion of true interactivity. It is very obvious that it
appeared merely because of the word that was typed. Finally, an IA’s assumption of a
human role is somewhat believable, however the appearance of most IAs reminds the
user immediately that they are dealing with something non-human. At present, most
agent technology appears in the form of cartoon-like characters. Although impressively
programmed, a mindless social response is likely not triggered by the appearance of a
purple cartoon gorilla on the screen that offers to teach something to the user.
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In past studies of social responses to computers, a human image was usually not
used. In fact, in most studies great pains were taken to remove any resemblance to a
human visage. However, this absence of a human image may in fact aid the studies. At
least there is not a less than perfect image to draw a person’s attention to the fact that they
are dealing with a machine. The social response to computers requires a certain
unawareness to occur.
In this study, the IA appeared as a small cartoon wizard. In it’s self-introduction,
it used synthesized verbal output, with a word balloon. During the computerized tasks
the IA, depending on the condition, either ignored the user (thus being clearly not
interactive) or attended to mouse clicks on the screen. This was somewhat interactive,
but quickly repetitive and predictable, as the task progressed. Taken all together, the
appearance, artificial sounding verbal output, and eventual lack of spontaneous
interactivity may have resulted in insufficient triggers for a mindless social response.
The predictability of the agent’s responses begs consideration of another factor.
Some researchers have suggested that in order for the social facilitation effect to occur, a
person must view his audience as unpredictable and potentially threatening (Guerin and
Innes, 1982). Concerns about the IA’s ability to trigger a mindless social response
notwithstanding, there is a possibility that the agent was too predictable to cause a
participant to experience increased physiological arousal and exhibit the social
facilitation effect. Indeed, if this explanation of the social facilitation effect is accurate,
then it is unlikely that an intelligent agent would be able to cause changes in a person’s
task performance. An IA on a computer screen is hardly threatening, and oftentimes
predictable.
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Another problem with the predictability of the IA is the question of distraction.
Baron et al. (1978) attributes social facilitation and the arousal that causes it to the
distraction that an onlooker causes. They believe that the distraction caused by an
audience is what makes one become physiologically aroused and change their
performance. The IA in this study might not have been sufficiently distracting to affect
anyone. As already addressed, it was quite predictable. Furthermore, participants
indicated that all four Agent conditions were equally distracting. It is hard to determine
why this is so. Perhaps the IAs were too repetitive and participants simply tuned them
out shortly after the computerized tasks began. After all, most participants indicated that
they stopped attending to the IA fairly early on into the computerized tasks. Regardless,
if distraction is the true cause of social facilitation, then the four Agent conditions were
not sufficiently different in terms of this variable to cause a difference in arousal and
performance. Whether this lack of IA distraction is due to insufficient planning on the
part of the experimenter or if the type of IA used is simply not very distracting is difficult
to determine. Attempts were made to make the IA noticeable (i.e., use of sound effects,
position of IA in the center of the computer screen, size of IA), but it was also important
that it not be so distracting as to make completion of the computerized task impossible or
improbable.
Another consideration in this particular study is that the task deemed complex
may not have been complex enough. In other words, perhaps both tasks were “simple”
and consequently, the complex task was not affected by social facilitation in the manner
expected. Perhaps both tasks, simple and complex, were instead facilitated. This is
possible, however the lack of difference compared to the control condition casts doubt on
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this explanation. Also, analysis of the difficulty variable lends support to the idea that
there truly was a difference between the simple and complex condition. When comparing
the simple to the complex condition, participants completed more simple entries, entered
them faster, experienced less arousal during them, and indicated that they considered
them to be of lesser difficulty compared to the complex tasks. Unfortunately, past social
facilitation studies fail to indicate how much more difficult a complex task must be
compared to a simple one. They simply refer to one task being hard and another one
being easy. How they arrive at this operationalization is a mystery. Usually one task
appears to be more difficult than the other one, as in this study, but whether it is
sufficiently more difficult is not addressed. One can only hope that the difference in
difficulty between the tasks in this study was sufficient. The data would suggest that it
was.
Finally, a last concern for this study’s failure to find a significant effect for the
Agent condition is the participants’ self-report of feeling monitored. Participants were
asked whether they felt that they were being monitored during the experiment in a
questionnaire at the end of the study. Regardless of which condition they found
themselves in, all four conditions indicated that they felt equally monitored. In other
words, participants in the control condition said that they felt monitored just as much as
participants in the idle, active, and remote agent conditions. Also, when asked how much
they felt like they were being watched, most participants answered that they did feel like
they were being watched at least a little bit, regardless of which agent condition they
found themselves in. If this is true, then it is possible that the participants in the control
condition exhibited social facilitation just the same as the other conditions. Perhaps
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participants did not believe that they were being left alone, unmonitored, to complete
their computerized tasks in the control condition. Perhaps they believed that the
experimenter was videotaping them or somehow watching secretly. If they believed this,
then perhaps they experienced just as much arousal as the other conditions and exhibited
social facilitation too.
So we are left with several possibilities. It is certainly feasible that the presence
of an IA during a computerized task does not cause sufficient physiological arousal to
cause a change in task performance. However, it is also a possibility that the stimuli were
insufficient to cause the social facilitation effect to take place. Maybe none of the
participants were exhibiting social facilitation due to the predictability or lack of
distraction that the agent presented. Conversely, perhaps all of the participants were
exhibiting social facilitation due to the belief, across all conditions, that the experimenter
was monitoring their performance.
The role of LOC. In this experiment, the data indicated that locus of control did
not moderated the effects of IAs on physiological arousal nor task performance. Before
even considering LOC, the Agent condition was found to have no effect on arousal or
performance. However, it was possible that an interaction might exist between the Agent
condition and LOC that was simply cancelled out at the aggregate level. But that was not
the case. No interaction was found.
Notably, LOC was found to correlate significantly with the arousal that
participants reported during the computerized tasks. Some studies have found similar
results. Researchers have demonstrated that people possessing a more external LOC
seem to be more sensitive to some environmental stressors than internals (Coovert &
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Goldstein, 1980; Lefcourt et al., 1981). This experiment’s results proved to be no
exception to that finding. Participants measured as possessing a more internal LOC
experienced less arousal during the computerized tasks. This finding further reinforces
that externals may in fact be more sensitive to stressors.
Another interesting finding was that participants with a more internal LOC
reported in the post task questionnaire that they judged the computerized tasks to be less
difficult when compared to the judgments of externals. This also seems to follow past
observations that externals are more sensitive to stressors. Perhaps those with a more
external LOC experienced more stress while performing the computerized tasks and
consequently found the tasks to be more difficult because of their heightened anxiety.
Finally, when initial analyses were performed on the data, the difficulty variable
appeared to have a main effect on both participant performance and arousal. However,
when LOC was controlled for, as a covariate, the effects of task difficulty no longer
appeared to have an effect on arousal. This comes as no surprise because LOC was
shown to correlate with arousal, but not with performance. Controlling for the influence
of LOC left difficulty affecting only performance. Had LOC not correlated with arousal,
this effect would not have occurred.
The role of MCP. Microcomputer playfulness turned out to have some interesting
relationships in this study. Initially MCP did not correlate significantly with either
performance or arousal. However, upon further investigation, when MCP was included
in the analyses as a covariate, an interaction with the Agent condition was uncovered.
Following Pedhazur’s (1997) instructions on testing for moderation between a continuous
and categorical variable, it was found that although at the aggregate level MCP did not
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correlate significantly with arousal or performance, when the data was separated into four
groups based on membership in the Agent conditions, MCP did correlate significantly
with arousal in one condition and approached significance in another.
In the two conditions that had no IA visibly present on the computer screen, MCP
did not correlate with arousal. However, in the other two conditions that did have an IA
on screen, MCP was found to correlate significantly with arousal in one condition and
appeared to be approaching significance in the other. In the idle Agent condition, MCP
was found to negatively correlate with arousal. In other words, participants who reported
having a more playful attitude towards computers also experienced less arousal when the
IA was present and appeared to pay no attention to the participant’s behavior. In that
condition, the IA appeared somewhat attentive when the task began, but quickly began to
ignore the participant’s onscreen behaviors and soon appeared to fall asleep for the
remainder of the task. Apparently, participants with a less playful attitude towards
computers found this IA behavior to be more stressful than their more playful
counterparts.
With the potential to be even more interesting, in the active Agent condition the
results were reversed. In that condition, MCP was found to be approaching a statistically
significant positive correlation with arousal (p = .07). Although not achieving the alpha
limit, it is nonetheless suggestive of a reversal in the relationship between MCP and
arousal. In this condition, the IA appeared very attentive when the task began and
continued to attend to many of the participant’s onscreen behaviors throughout the entire
task. It would seem that, in this case, participants with a less playful attitude towards
computers found this IA behavior to be less stressful than more playful participants.

71

These findings are curious. The literature on MCP suggests that in both Agent
conditions those participants with higher levels of the playfulness trait would experience
less stress. Webster and Martocchio (1992) found that people who were high in MCP
exhibited a positive mood and greater satisfaction when operating computers. They also
found that MCP was negatively correlated with computer anxiety and positively
correlated with positive affect and satisfaction during computer use. However, the
findings in this study suggest that in order for MCP to result in such desirable effects, it
might be important to consider exactly what is taking place on the computer. Perhaps
simply having an idle agent on the screen resulted in a more positive experience for those
with high MCP but actually having the IA actively monitoring the high MCP participant
proved too much a distraction and resulted in increased arousal. Future research will
have to address this question in greater detail.
Lastly, MCP was found to correlate with how long participants reported attending
to the IA during the computerized tasks. Those with high MCP reported attending to the
IA for a longer duration. This finding converges well with past literature. Webster and
Martocchio (1992) warn that those with high MCP might take longer to complete tasks
on a computer and may exhibit overinvolvement. They caution that high MCP
individuals might become easily distracted with unimportant aspects of computer
programs. This study is no exception, participants with higher MCP appear to have
found themselves attending to the IA longer than others.
Correlates of Arousal. Finally, arousal, measured in this study as state stress
(Spielberger et al., 1970) correlated as would be generally expected. Although not
particularly unexpected, it deserves a brief mentioning. Participant reports of whether
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they felt monitored or not during the tasks correlated with arousal. Those who believed
they were being monitored reported higher arousal than those who believed they were
not. Similarly, participant reports of how much a participant felt that s/he was being
watched during the tasks correlated with arousal too. Those most felt that they were
being watched reported the highest arousal in the study. Participant reports of how much
they liked the IA correlated with arousal. Those expressing that they liked the IA
experienced less arousal than those who did not. Also, participant reports of how
distracting they found the IA correlated with arousal. Those finding the IA most
distracting experienced greater arousal than those who did not find the IA distracting. All
of these correlations, make intuitive sense and further speak to the apparent validity of
the measures used in this study.
Implications of the Findings
There are several notable implications of the findings in this study. Intelligent
agents and the two traits, locus of control and microcomputer playfulness, were revealed
to have effects and relationships that future employers and computer programmers might
do well to attend to.
Intelligent agents were demonstrated to have no effect on the performance of
participants in this study. Assuming for a moment that these results are accurate, it
would seem that software programmers need not concern themselves with worries that
having an IA present on a computer screen might prove so distracting or stressful as to
retard the performance of an individual using them. However, IAs are not completely
without effect. In this study it was found that certain people, based on individual
differences, might experience more or less arousal (stress) as a result of an IA’s presence
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and apparent behavior. This is an area in the literature that requires more attention.
Some people may find the actual IA behaviors more stressful than others. This would
certainly be a drawback to IAs. IAs are meant to be assistants to computer users. If their
behaviors are found to be stressful, they may be an unwelcome guest on some people’s
computers. Employers, hoping that the addition of an IA on an employee’s computer will
result in greater productivity, might be disappointed. Although the IA in this study did
not affect performance, the cumulative effect of multiple stressors, the IA being one of
them, might have deleterious effects on employees. Eventually this is likely to impact
one’s performance in a negative way. Also, as IA technology improves, more lifelike
IAs may eventually possess the traits necessary to cause a person to mindlessly react to
them in a social manner. When this day comes, we may find that people actually do
exhibit the social facilitation effect in the presence of an IA. One published study
already suggests that this is the case (Rickenberg & Reeves, 2000).
Another important implication of this study is locus of control’s relationship with
stress/arousal. Clearly, those with a more external LOC seem to have experienced more
stress. Also, externals reported that their tasks were more difficult overall. Organizations
need to be aware of this relationship. Some jobs that are particularly high in stress might
be better served by individuals possessing a more internal LOC. Externals put into a
particularly stressful situation might suffer more than their more internal counterparts,
perhaps experiencing the side effects of prolonged stress sooner and with more severity.
It is also possible that externals might find their tasks at work to be more difficult and
stressful. This is not to say that organizations should only hire those who possess an
internal LOC, however in occupations that are especially stressful it might be in the
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external’s best interest to avoid such occupations or at least find effective ways to deal
with stress while on the job.
Microcomputer playfulness turned out to an important factor in this study. It
needs to be studied more carefully. Apparently participants reacted to different IA
behaviors in opposite ways depending on their level of MCP. Idle IA behaviors caused
high MCPs to experience less arousal but active IA behaviors caused them to experience
more. This is difficult to explain. Despite the uncertainty this produces, one thing is
clear. High MCP in employees that work with computers may not be entirely beneficial
in all cases. It may depend on the type of program that is being used. Different onscreen
output may cause differing stress reactions from a person high in MCP. Prior to this
study, it might have been assumed that high MCPs approached all computer problems
similarly, that is, in a positive and upbeat manner. This study casts doubt on that
assumption.
Also, MCP was related to how long the participants attended to the IAs. This
further emphasizes a previous conclusion about MCP. Those high in MCP may become
distracted or preoccupied with their computers. This might be a good quality to seek in
employees who are expected to be creative on their computers. It might be desirable in
programmers, graphic artists, and the like. However, the employee who is expected to
simply use his/her computer to perform a specific task, such as an accountant, data
analyst, or receptionist, without wasting undue time with a program’s many options and
extras might be better off with a more moderate level of MCP. Extremely low levels of
MCP, which might correlate strongly with computer anxiety would be undesirable, but
extremely high levels might be equally so. An organization cannot afford to pay an
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employee who’d rather spend their time continually testing out a computer’s menu of
options than doing their assigned job tasks.
Study Limitations
Every study has limitation and shortcomings, this one had several important ones.
Participants used in this study were primarily female. Although it would be preferable to
have an equal mix of both genders, at the university that this study was conducted at,
females appear to outnumber males in the psychology department. Hence this affects
generalizability. It would be a stretch to generalize results to both males and females
because of the disproportionate number of females in the sample.
Also, the stimuli in this study were presented in a small private room. This was
necessary to be certain that participants, should they exhibit the social facilitation effect,
were doing so entirely because of the IA’s presence and nothing else. However, in the
real world people rarely work on their computers in complete isolation. Many do their
tasks in cubicles, with people moving about, and are distracted by a variety of unforeseen
events. Therefore it is possible that the arousal that participants displayed, as a result of
the interaction between MCP and IAs, would not occur in the real world where there are
many more important things to worry and stress out about. This is another obstacle to the
external validity of this study. This is often the case in controlled experiments. What
they gain in internal validity, they lack in external validity.
On the subject of internal validity, there was one substantial concern related to
this. As mentioned earlier, participants reported that they believed they were being
watched or monitored equally across all four Agent conditions. This is unfortunate. It
would have been more desirable for participants in the control condition to indicate that
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they believed that they were not being monitored in any way. It is understandable that a
participant, placed in a room by themselves during an experiment, might believe that they
are being watched. It is understandable, but greater pains should have been taken to
convince them that they were in fact not being observed in any way while performing
their tasks. It could be, however, that when participants indicated that they felt they were
being monitored, what they meant was they believed that their performance was being
scored and recorded electronically by the computer. This question should have been
written differently. Future research should be alert to address this question more
carefully.
Finally, the sample size is another concern. Most literature indicates that the
social facilitation effect is of medium effect size. However, some have hypothesized that
it is instead a small effect size (Bond & Titus, 1983). If they are correct, then the sample
(N= 103) may have been of insufficient power to detect a small effect size, particularly in
the interactions.
Future Directions
If this topic should be investigated further in the years ahead, it would be
beneficial to attempt it in a field setting. The arousal that an intelligent agent causes
might fade in a work setting where many distractions and stressors exist. Also, as
intelligent agent technology progresses, it would be good to revisit this topic to see if
improvements in the technology cause people to respond mindlessly in other ways. It is
easy to imagine a person responding to an image of a human face occupying their
monitor space, looking into their eyes, and interacting and making suggestions to them
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just like a regular person. One day, that might be exactly the way an intelligent agent
operates.
The locus of control trait has been the subject of innumerable studies. It is likely
that this will continue to be the case. Further study of the relationship between locus of
control and perceived stress might be beneficial. Also, the microcomputer playfulness
trait has barely caught the notice of most researchers. Clearly, based on the results of this
study, it is a significant trait that merits further investigation. Future scientists should
study it and its interactions in different computerized situations. It may eventually
become an important trait to select employees for in the computer field.
Also, if this study should be replicated, it must be done so with a more gender
representative sample. It is important that results be generalizable to both males and
females. They might be found to react differently to IAs. Also, it is crucial that future
social facilitation studies go to great lengths to assure that those who are in the control
condition truly believe that they are performing without an onlooker. This is harder than
it sounds. Participants are curious and suspicious of deception when they knowingly
enter an experimental setting. They are likely to doubt that they are performing a task
without any witnesses present. Most probably believe that they are being watched, either
by a person or by video camera. After all, why would someone be asked to perform in an
experiment if nobody was interested in what they were doing?
In conclusion, despite the several limitations that existed in this experiment, its
results are interesting and important. Intelligent agents seem to leave a person’s
computerized task performance unaffected despite their subtle effect on some people’s
arousal. Further verification of the role of the locus of control trait on stress was found
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and suggests the need for a closer look at that relationship. Finally, the microcomputer
playfulness trait, a young variable in the psychological field, was revealed to interact with
intelligent agents and affect participant arousal. It was also found to relate to one’s
attention to intelligent agents. Both are interesting findings and possible sources of future
research.
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Appendix A: Microcomputer Playfulness Questionnaire
DIRECTIONS: There are seven items listed below. Each one is a different way a person
might describe him or herself when using a personal computer. For each item, please
click the response that best matches how much you agree or disagree with the word as a
description of yourself when you use a personal computer. For example, if the item was
“impulsive” and you think that when you work on a personal computer you are not
impulsive, you would want to click on either the statement “disagree” or “strongly
disagree.”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Spontaneous
Unimaginative
Flexible
Creative
Playful
Unoriginal
Uninventive

(Answers range from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”)
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Appendix B: Demographics Questionnaire
1. What is your age?
2. What is your ethnic heritage?
o
o
o
o
o
o

American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian, Asian American or Pacific Islander
African American/Black
Hispanic/Latino
Caucasian/White
Other (Specify)__________

3. What is your gender?
o Male
o Female
4. What is the highest grade you have completed in college?
o
o
o
o
o

Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Some Graduate School
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Appendix C: State Stress Questionnaire
Please read these instructions carefully. Ten statements that people have used to describe
themselves will appear next. Read each statement and type the appropriate value in the
box provided to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement. Give the
answer that seems to best describe your present feelings.
1. I feel calm.
2. I am tense.
3. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes.
4. I feel at ease.
5. I feel nervous.
6. I am jittery.
7. I am relaxed.
8. I am worried.
9. I feel frightened.
10. I feel steady.
(Answers range from “not at all” to “very much so.”)
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Appendix D: Sphere of Control Questionnaire
DIRECTIONS: Twenty statements that people have used to describe themselves are
below. Read each statement and click the appropriate answer to indicate how much you
agree with the statement. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much
time on any one statement. Give the answer that seems to best describe you.
1. I can usually achieve what I want when I work hard for it.
2. I have no trouble making and keeping friends.
3. I prefer games involving some luck over games of pure skill.
4. I often find it hard to get my point of view across to others.
5. Almost anything is possible for me if I really want it.
6. I find it easy to play an important part in most group situations.
7. I usually do not set goals because I have a hard time following through on them.
8. I can usually develop a close personal relationship with someone I find appealing.
9. Bad luck has sometimes prevented me from achieving things.
10. I can learn almost anything if I set my mind to it.
11. In my personal relationships, the other person usually has more control over the
relationship than I do.
12. My major accomplishments are entirely due to my hard work and ability.
13. If there is someone I want to meet I can usually arrange it.
14. I’m not good at guiding the course of a conversation with several others.
15. Most of what will happen in my career is beyond my control.
16. When I need assistance with something, I often find it difficult to get others to
help.
17. Once I make plans I am almost certain to make them work.
18. In attempting to smooth over a disagreement I sometimes make it worse.
19. I find it pointless to keep worrying on something that is too difficult for me.
20. I can usually steer a conversation toward the topics I want to talk about.
(Answers range from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”)
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Appendix E: Post Experiment/Manipulation Check Questionnaire
1. How much experience have you had with intelligent agents prior to this study?
Please indicate your experience level on a scale from 1 to 10 (If you don’t know
what an intelligent agent is, answer 1).
o 1
o 2
o 3
o 4
o 5
o 6
o 7
o 8
o 9
o 10
2. During the computerized tasks that you worked on, did you feel as if your
performance was being monitored?
o Yes
o No
3. Please indicate how much you felt as if your behavior was being watched during
the computerized tasks.
o Not At All
o Very Little
o Some
o Quite a bit
o Very much
4. Was there an intelligent agent on the computer screen during the computerized
tasks that you worked on? (The intelligent agent would have looked like a small
animated wizard.)
o Yes
o No
5. Did you see a small animated character, that looked like a wizard, on the
computer screen during the computerized tasks that you worked on?
o Yes
o No
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6. Did you feel like the experimenter was secretly watching you during the
computerized tasks that you worked on in private?
o Yes
o No
7. Prior to this study, how much experience have you had with data entry type tasks
(1=No experience to 10=Very experienced)?
o 1
o 2
o 3
o 4
o 5
o 6
o 7
o 8
o 9
o 10
8. During the computerized task that you worked on, did the mouse work ok?
o Yes
o No (If no, please tell the experimenter)
9. During the computerized tasks that you worked on, at what point did you stop
paying attention to the intelligent agent? (The intelligent agent would have looked
like a small animated wizard.)
o There was no intelligent agent present
o Almost immediately
o After just a couple of minutes
o About halfway through the tasks
o Near the end of the tasks
o I was continually aware of the intelligent agent
10. On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 = very east and 10 = very difficult, how would
you rate:
a. The task that involved data entry only?
o 1
o 2
o 3
o 4
o 5
o 6
o 7
o 8
o 9
o 10
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b. The task that involved some data entry, as well as branch code lookups, and
some use of equations?
o 1
o 2
o 3
o 4
o 5
o 6
o 7
o 8
o 9
o 10
11. How distracting was the intelligent agent during the computerized tasks? (The
intelligent agent would have looked like a small animated wizard.)
o There was no intelligent agent present
o Did not distract me at all
o He was a little bit distracting
o He distracted me a lot
o He was a continual source of distraction
12. How did you feel about the intelligent agent during the computerized tasks? (The
intelligent agent would have looked like a small animated wizard.)
o There was no intelligent agent present
o I disliked him
o I found him mildly unappealing
o I liked him a little bit
o I really liked him
13. During the computerized tasks, did the intelligent agent ever disappear from the
screen and fail to return? (The intelligent agent would have looked like a small
animated wizard.)
o There was no intelligent agent in my computerized tasks
o It stayed on screen continually
o It disappeared at one point and then reappeared (Please inform the
experimenter if this occurred)
o It disappeared and never reappeared (Please inform the experimenter if this
occurred)
14. During the computerized tasks, did any unexpected pop-up windows appear on
the screen (other than the branch codes window)?
o Yes (If yes, please tell the experimenter)
o No
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